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THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE OKLAHOMA INDIANS:
A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF INDIAN
TRIBES IN OKLAHOMA
F. Browning Pipestem *
and
G. William Rice * "
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, sup-
ported by a host of decisions... is the principle that those
powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not,
in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Con-
gress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished.... What is not expressly
limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty....'
Introduction
The nature of the federal government's role within the American
federal system has changed significantly with the adoption of the
"New Federalism" strategy or approach to the delivery of federal
programs. New Federalism basically propounds a shift in the
balance of governmental decision making away from the federal
complex in Washington toward the exercise of these respon-
sibilities on the local level by local general purpose government.
The definition of "local general purpose government" includes
within its meaning Indian tribal governments in Oklahoma, and a
number of Indian tribes in Oklahoma receive and administer
federal funds under this concept.
A more particular Indian version of the New Federalism concept
was ushered into existence with the advent of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975.2 New
Federalism and Indian self-determination both revolve around a
political theorem that local initiatives and local decisions result in
a more effective and accountable government.
New Federalism and Indian self-determination combined in the
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Indian context put squarely into issue the legal and managerial
capacity of tribal governments to assume effectively the substan-
tial responsibilities involved in cooperatively developing policy
and providing a broad range of governmental services. For in-
stance, the capacity of tribal governments in Oklahoma to assume
governmental decision-making responsibilities and to govern ef-
fectively in the context of the emerging federal system ultimately
depends upon the vitality of tribal powers of self-government and
jurisdiction to enforce tribal decisions.
In addition to the legal significance attached to enhancing the
role of tribal government in the delivery of public sector services,
a different facet of the same problem is presented in a managerial
context and the necessity for an inventory of tribal powers
becomes equally as apparent. The New Federalism and Indian self-
determination governmental strategies require an unprecedented
level of intergovernmental interaction. The building of tribal
managerial capacity within this kind of environment essentially
revolves around acknowledgment and awareness of governmental
prerogatives, agendas, and flow of authority between entities. In
other words, the various elements of government having specific
responsibilities to discharge relative to tribal government and
tribal constituencies cannot adroitly address the mutual problems
inherent in the New Federalism and Indian self-determination ap-
proaches without tribal participation. Likewise, the fiscal
restraints on tribal government, or better stated, the governmental
poverty of most Indian tribes, dictates that tribal managers cannot
manage in isolation from other government.
The effective manager in an intergovernmental context is one
who knows the legal competence and institutional capacities of his
own government and meshes these capacities with those being
cooperatively managed or shared from the federal side. In situa-
tions where competing local governmental claims to authority oc-
cur, such as competing claims to civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country, it is essential, in order to avoid unintentional
conflicts and denial of services, that tribal governing bodies, tribal
planners, potential competitors for governmental authority over
Indian country, and administrative personnel within federal agen-
cies have a working knowledge of tribal governmental power.
The purpose of the following analysis is to provide a general
survey of the political and governmental powers presently exer-
cisable by Indian tribal governments in Oklahoma. The legal
perspective adopted for these purposes is to apply the ordinary
analytic framework regarding tribal legal status to the variety of
legal and factual circumstances presented by the status quo of In-
dian tribal governments in Oklahoma. The parameter of the or-
dinary analytic framework from which to view tribal powers at
any given time was perhaps best stated by Felix Cohen, the noted
authority on Indian law, reiterated here:
Each Indian tribe begins its relationship with the federal
government as a sovereign power, recognized as such in trea-
ty and legislation. The powers of sovereignty have been
limited from time to time by special treaties and laws de-
signed to take from the Indian tribes control of matters
which, in the judgment of Congress, these tribes could no
longer be safely permitted to handle. The statutes of Con-
gress, then, must be examined to determine the limitation of
tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or its
positive content.3
A review of the basic congressional enactments and other perti-
nent legal sources revealed at least two separate and legally signifi-
cant patterns of legislative treatment. These two separate legal
patterns began to take shape in 1890 with the creation of the Ter-
ritory of Oklahoma.
Prior to 1890, the geographic area which later became the state
of Oklahoma was known as the Indian Territory. The only
governments operating in the Indian Territory prior to 1890 were
the Indian tribal governments and the federal government. All of
the Indian Territory by definition was "Indian country" for tribal
governmental purposes. The date is important because Congress
established the Territory of Oklahoma as a formally organized
Territory of the United States on May 2, 1890, and defined the
boundaries in the following manner:
That all that portion of the United States now known as
the Indian Territory (except so much of the same as is actual-
ly occupied by the Five Civilized Tribes, and the Indian tribes
within the Quapaw Indian Agency, and except the unoc-
cupied part of the Cherokee Outlet), together with that por-
tion of the United States known as the public land strip, is
hereby erected into a temporary government by the name of
the Territory of Oklahoma.4
With the creation of the Territory of Oklahoma, Congress
began to cut two separate legal patterns, one for the Indian tribes
3. COHEN, supra note 1.
4. Act of May 2,1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81 (1890).
in Oklahoma Territory and another for the Indian tribes in what
remained of Indian Territory. The following analysis of tribal
governmental powers is organized along the lines of the legal pat-
terns cut by Congress and is divided into five time periods.
The pre-1890 period is governed primarily by treaty and by and
large represents an era in which the Indian tribes in the Indian Ter-
ritory operated indigenous tribal systems with little interference
from other governments.
The 1890-1907 period is the most significant period for all of the
tribes. During this period, the Territory of Oklahoma was
established by the Congress; the allotment of tribal domains to in-
dividual Indians under the General Allotment Act of 1887 and
special allotment acts relating to the Five Civilized Tribes and the
Osages came during this period; Congress assumed political con-
trol of the Indian Territory and began the statutory dismember-
ment of the Five Civilized Tribes; and, in 1907, the state of
Oklahoma was admitted into the Union.
The 1890-1907 period largely defined the previously mentioned
legal patterns for the Indian tribes in the two territories. The In-
dian tribes in both territories entered this era as separate
sovereigns which preexisted the Constitution. The legal status of
the Indian tribes after this time period came to a close is the focus
of the present inquiry. In other words, the tribes began the era in
1890 with a full cornucopia of powers; when the era ended in
1907, what powers had Congress limited, modified, or eliminated
from the cornucopia?
Talton v. Mayes,' a case out of this era involving the Cherokee
Nation in the Indian Territory, determined that only Congress has
plenary authority over the Indian tribes to limit, modify, or
eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes
otherwise possess. Basically, the majority of this survey of tribal
powers is devoted to considering the legal aftermath of the actions
of Congress affecting tribal governments during this period. The
later periods, 1907 -1934, 1934-1953, and 1953-present, represent
a later sifting through or interpretation of Congress' actions from
1890 to 1907.
A general survey of tribal governmental powers should have
been undertaken forty or fifty years ago. From then to now, the
intellectual sifting process on legal principles and varying factual
situations could have taken place, and we would have by now had
the total definitive statement on tribal government in Oklahoma.
A general survey is to print the outlines and chart the future ac-
5. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
tivities. Department of the Interior Solicitor Margold, in his now
classic legal opinion relating to tribal governmental powers astute-
ly indicated both the utility and limitations of a general survey of
tribal powers by stating:
The question of what powers are vested in an Indian tribe
or tribal council by existing law cannot be answered in detail
for each Indian tribe without reference to hundreds of special
treaties and special acts of Congress. It is possible, however,
on the basis of the reported cases, the written opinions of the
various executive departments, and those statutes of Con-
gress which are of general import, to define the powers which
have heretofore been recognized as lawfully within the
jurisdiction of an Indian tribe. My answer to the propounded
question, then, will be general and subject to correction for
particular tribes in the light of the treaties and statutes af-
fecting such tribe wherever such treaties and statutes contain
peculiar provisions restricting or enlarging the general
authority of an Indian tribe.6
Source and Scope of Tribal Powers in General
A. From what source does an Indian tribe draw its charter as an
entity with powers of self-government?
1. Inherent Charter
It is an established axiom of federal Indian law and a respected
judicial doctrine reaching from the earliest days of the United
States that Indian tribes are "distinct, independent political com-
munities, retaining their original natural rights" in matters of local
self-government.7 The "original natural rights" of self-government
have been described as inherent rights, inherent in the tribal legal
status because Indian tribes were possessed of these rights from
time immemorial and as such, they are not derived from constitu-
tional or statutory sources. One commentator succinctly de-
scribed the unique legal status of Indian tribal governments in the
following manner: "The Indian tribe is a unique component in our
federal system of government. Unlike all our other governmental
institutions, the tribe is not a creature of the Constitution of the
United States, nor of the federal government created by the Con-
stitution, nor of the states which created the Constitution."8
6. 55 I.D. 14, 17-18 (1934).
7. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
8. Dean, The Consent of the Governed-A New Concept in Indian Affairs, 48 N.D.L.
REV. 533 (1972).
Because all of the Indian tribal governments in Oklahoma predate
the United States Constitution, the tribal power to be self-
governing cannot derive from an aspect of the national sovereign-
ty delegated to the tribes by the Congress." Similarly, the organic
law of the states cannot be the source of tribal powers because the
Indian tribal governments predate the state governments. As
separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution and the states
which created the Constitution, Indian tribes have the inherent
power of regulating their internal and social relations. This con-
cept, known generally as tribal sovereignty, is the cornerstone of
tribal governmental powers.
The tribal right of self-government is perhaps the fundamental
concept in the Indian law, and the tribal charter of authority to ex-
ercise these powers in written or unwritten form is inherent in the
tribal legal status. Ultimately, the direct source of the inherent
powers is the will of the people who are members of the tribe.
Solicitor Margold, in defining the source of tribal powers, stated:
"In point of form, it is immaterial whether the powers of an Indian
tribe are expressed and exercised through customs handed down
by word of mouth or through written constitutions and statutes.
In either case, the laws of the Indian tribe owe their force to the
will of the members of the tribe."'
The source of tribal powers was clearly identified by the
Supreme Court of the United States in a criminal case arising
under Cherokee law in the Indian Territory. The issue in Talton v.
Mayes" spoke directly to the inherent powers as the charter for
tribal law. An indictment under Cherokee law was challenged as
improper by the defendant for the reason that it did not meet the
due process requirements of the fifth amendment. The Court held
the fifth amendment inapplicable to tribal criminal actions,
stating:
The case ... depends upon whether the powers of local
government exercised by the Cherokee nation are federal
powers created by and springing from the Constitution of the
United States, and hence controlled by the Fifth Amendment
to that Constitution, or whether they are local powers not
created by the Constitution, although subject to its general
provisions and the paramount authority of Congress. The
repeated adjudications of this Court have long since
answered the former question in the negative ....
9. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
10. 55 I.D. 14,20 (1934).
11. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
True it is that in many adjudications of this court the fact
has been fully recognized, that although possessed of these
attributes of local self-government, when exercising their
tribal functions, all such rights are subject to the supreme
legislative authority of the United States .... But the ex-
istence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner in
which the local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be exer-
cised does not render such local powers federal powers aris-
ing from and created by the Constitution of the United
States. 2
This rule of law is a rule of general application applying equally to
all Indian tribes in Oklahoma and across the nation.
The legal principles enunciated in Talton first found their
judicial expression in the United States Supreme Court in the foun-
dation case, Worcester v. Georgia.' The opinion, written by Chief
Justice John Marshall, involved a jurisdictional dispute between,
on the one hand, the United States and the Cherokee Nation, and,
on the other hand, the state of Georgia. Marshall found the state
of Georgia's penal sanction against a missionary living among the
Cherokee unconstitutional and an intrusion on the exclusive
federal jurisdiction over Indian matters. Chief Justice Marshall set
forth his now classic analysis of the legal status of tribal govern-
merit vis-a-vis the federal and state governments as follows:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities.., and the settled doc-
trine of the law of nations is that a weaker power does not
surrender its independence-its right to self-government-by
associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A
weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself
under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping
itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a
state ....
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct political communi-
ty, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity
with treaties and with acts of Congress. The whole inter-
course between the United States and this nation, is, by our
constitution and laws, vested in the Government of the
12. Id. at 382-84.
13. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
United States. The act of the State of Georgia, under which
the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is, consequently void,
and the judgment a nullity ......
The Supreme Court in a later affirmation of the judicial doctrine
announced in Worcester, stated in United States v. Kagama,"
Perhaps the best statement of their position is found in the
two opinions of this court by Chief Justice Marshall in the
case of the Cherokee Nations v. Georgia, and in the case of
Worcester v. State of Georgia. These opinions are ex-
haustive; and in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Baldwin,
in the former, is a very valuable resume of the treaties and
statutes concerning the Indian tribes previous to and during
the confederation.
In the first of the above cases it was held that these tribes
were neither States nor nations, had only some of the at-
tributes of sovereignty, and could not be so far recognized in
that capacity as to sustain a suit in the Supreme Court of the
United States. In the second case it was said that they were
not subject to the jurisdiction asserted over them by the State
of Georgia, which, because they were within its limits, where
they had been for ages, had attempted to extend her laws and
the jurisdiction of her courts over them. [Citations omitted.]'"
And in the same opinion, the Court described the status of the In-
dian tribes in the following manner:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders
of the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to
the people of the United States has always been an
anomalous one and of a complex character ....
They were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of
the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people,
with the power of regulating their internal and social rela-
tions, and thus far not brought under the laws of the state
within whose limits they resided."
And, in Native American Church v. Navajo Tribe,'" the following
passage aptly described the tribal status:
.4. Id. at 559-60.
15. 118 U.S. 375 (1885).
1.6. Id. at 382.
1.7. Id. at 381.
1.8. 272 F.2d 131 (1959).
But as declared in the decisions hereinbefore discussed, In-
dian tribes are not states. They have a status higher than that
of states. They are subordinate and dependent nations
possessed of all powers as such only to the extent that they
have expressly been required to surrender them by the
superior sovereign, the United States."
The law governing Indian matters is essentially a shared federal
and tribal responsibility to the exclusion of the various states. The
power of state governments over Indian affairs conclusively rests
upon delegation of responsibility from the United States Congress.
2. Grants of Authority to Tribal Government
Inherent in the plenary authority of Congress to alter, limit, or
eliminate tribal powers is the authority to confer additional
powers on tribal governments. These grants of authority represent
a second source from which tribal powers are derived.
B. In general, what are the categorical powers of self-government
exercisable by Indian tribes?
For the purpose of establishing parameters, the generally ac-
cepted inherent powers of tribal government have been
authoritatively set forth by Solicitor Margold." This treatment of
tribal powers is extensively quoted below.
The inherent powers of self-government, unless terminated by
law or waived by treaty, are:
1. The Power of an Indian Tribe to Define its Form of
Government.
The power to adopt a form of government, to create
various offices and to prescribe the duties thereof, to provide
for the manner of election and removal of tribal officers, to
prescribe the procedure of the tribal council and subordinate
committees or councils, to provide for the salaries or ex-
penses of tribal officers and other expenses of public
business, and, in general to prescribe the forms through
which the will of the tribe is to be executed.
2. The Power of an Indian Tribe to Determine its Member-
ship.
To define the conditions of membership within the tribe, to
prescribe rules for adoption, to classify the members of the
19. Id. at 134.
20. 55 I.D. 14 (1934).
tribe, and to grant or withhold the right of suffrage in all
matters save those as to which voting qualifications are
specifically defined by the Wheeler-Howard Act (that is, the
referendum on the act, and votes on acceptance, modifica-
tion, or revocation of constitution, bylaws, or charter), and
to make all other necessary rules and regulations governing
the membership of the tribe so far as may be consistent with
existing acts of Congress governing the enrollment and pro-
perty rights of members.
3. The Power of An Indian Tribe to Regulate Domestic Rela-
tions.
To regulate the domestic relations of its members by
prescribing rules and regulations concerning marriage,
divorce, legitimacy, adoption, the care of dependents, and
the punishment of offenses against the marriage relationship,
to appoint guardians for minors and mental incompetents,
and to issue marriage licenses and decrees of divorce, a-
dopting such state laws as seem advisable or establishing
separate tribal laws.
4. The Power of An Indian Tribe to Govern the Descent and
Distribution of Property.
To prescribe rules of inheritance with respect to all per-
sonal property and all interests in real property other than
regular allotments of land.
5. The taxing Power of An Indian Tribe.
To levy dues, fees, or taxes upon the members of the tribe
and upon nonmembers residing or doing any business of any
sort within the tribal jurisdiction, so far as may be consistent
with the power of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs over
licensed traders.
6. The Power of An Indian Tribe to Exclude Nonmembers
From Its Jurisdiction.
To remove or to exclude from the limits of the tribal
jurisdiction nonmembers of the tribe, excepting authorized
government officials and other persons now occupying In-
dian country under lawful authority, and to prescribe ap-
propriate rules and regulations governing such removal and
exclusion, and governiing the conditions under which
nonmembers of the tribe may come upon tribal land or have
dealings with tribal members, providing such acts are consis-
tent with federal laws governing trade with the Indian tribes.
7. Tribal Powers Over Property.
To regulate the use and disposition of all property within
the jurisdiction of the tribe and to make public expenditures
for the benefit of the tribe out of tribal funds where legal title
to such funds lies in the tribe.
8. The Powers of An Indian Tribe in the Administration of
Justice.
To administer justice with respect to all disputes and of-
fenses of or among the members of the tribe, other than the
ten major crimes reserved to the federal courts.
9. The Power of An Indian Tribe to Supervise Government
Employees.
To prescribe the duties and to regulate the conduct of
federal employees, but only insofar as such powers of super-
vision may be expressly delegated by the Interior Depart-
ment.2"
10. Power of Eminent Domain.
Each Indian tribe, unless the power has been expressly ter-
minated by Congress, has the power of eminent domain.
This power of sovereignty possessed by Indian tribes was
discussed in Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v.
George.' The issue arose when the Seneca Nation of Indians in
New York engaged in planning to expand their industrial park to
accommodate the location of a toy factory. Incident to these
economic development efforts, the Seneca Council enacted an or-
dinance for the acquisition of property in connection with the ex-
pansion of the industrial park. The ordinance set forth the pro-
cedures to be followed in condemning land and' vested jurisdiction
over such proceedings in the tribal court. In discussing the status
of the Seneca Nation, the court stated:
The Seneca Nation is a tribe of American Indians which
antedates the State of New York. Like other tribes, the
Seneca Nation is a quasi-sovereign entity possessing all the
inherent rights of sovereignty except where restrictions have
been placed thereon by the United States itself. There may be
dispute over whether in certain circumstances an Indian tribe
is an instrumentality of the federal government. But certainly
an Indian tribe is not a state. Indeed an Indian tribe is not
21. Id. at 30.
22. 348 F. Supp. 51 (1972).
subject to the law of a state except so far as the United States
has given its consent. [Citations omitted. ]
The plaintiff, the Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization,
challenged the tribal council and asserted that the Seneca Nation
lacked the power of eminent domain. The Court rejected their
argument, saying:
As previously noted, the Seneca Nation possesses all the
inherent rights of sovereignty except where restrictions have
been placed thereon by the United States. The power of emi-
nent domain "is an incident of sovereignty, and.., requires
no constitutional recognition." It is an "offspring of political
necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless
denied it by fundamental law."
[This] court has found no federal statute terminating the
tribal power of eminent domain. Moreover, enactment of 25
U.S.C. § 1302(5), a violation of which the plaintiffs allege,
indicates congressional recognition of the power. As was
stated in Kohl v. United States, the imposition of a limitation
on the power of eminent domain is "an implied assertion" of
the existence of the power.
The conclusion that Indian tribes possess the power of emi-
nent domain is reinforced by the view taken by the United
States Department of the Interior. The Department is given
broad authority over the conduct of Indian affairs, and the
views of its official on the question of the powers of Indian
tribes therefore carry weight. The Solicitor of the Depart-
ment has concluded that an Indian tribe organized under 25
U.S.C. § 476 possesses the power of eminent domain. The
reasoning of the opinion is applicable to the case of the
Seneca Nation, whose constitutional organization antedates
the enactment of 25 U.S.C. § 476, and who therefore do not
come within the coverage of the section. [Citations omit-
ted. ]2
The Congress has enacted general laws that apply to all tribal
governments and define certain aspects of the federal-Indian rela-
tionship which results usually in an expansion of tribal power to
act vis-a-vis the federal government. For example, the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,' places In-
2.3. Id. at 56.
24. Id. at 60.
2.5. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975), codifiedat25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n. (1970).
dian tribes, if they so choose, in a new and substantive position in
the assumption of governmental functions and the overall ad-
ministration of Indian affairs by creating a right to contract with
the federal government to provide essential services to their own
members. Another illustration of congressionally conferred tribal
power is 25 U.S.C. § 48, which states: "Where any of the tribes
are, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, competent to
direct the employment of their blacksmiths, mechanics, teachers,
farmers, or other persons engaged for them, the direction of such
persons may be given to the proper authority of the tribe."
In fact, a major feature of the Indian Self-Determination and
Educational Assistance Act, the provisions for federal employees
who become tribal employees and yet retain federal benefits, had
its beginning in early tribal contracting difficulties encountered by
tribes and federal employees interested in utilizing Section 48 of
Title 25 of the United States Code.
These powers of self-government are normally exercised by
tribal governments pursuant to tribal constitutions or other gov-
erning documents and a tribal code setting forth the legislative
enactments of the tribe in furtherance of these powers. In other
words, tribal governments having authority over certain subject
matter may enact tribal ordinances and promulgate tribal regula-
tions to implement the substance of that power. The power of In-
dian tribes to administer justice within the tribal domain is derived
from the substantive powers included in tribal sovereignty. For in-
stance, the judicial power of the tribe being grounded on tribal
sovereignty is coextensive with the tribe's legislative power. In
general, the jurisdiction of tribal courts is limited to tribal matters,
violations of the tribal criminal laws, and civil matters involving
tribal members on property, and under the 1968 Civil Rights Act
tribal criminal jurisdiction is limited to offenses punishable by no
more than a $500 fine or six months in jail.' Major crimes are tried
in the federal court, and exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction is
maintained unless a state has assumed jurisdiction over Indian
matters pursuant to congressional approval, usually through what
is popularly referred to as "Public Law 280.""27 Oklahoma was not
included in the original enactment of Public Law 280, and
although the state has, until recently, asserted jurisdiction over
most Indian matters, it has not formally followed the procedure
26. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968), codified at25 U.S.C. §
1302 (1970).
27. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
set forth in Public Law 280 for assumption of jurisdiction. As
recognized in the recent Littlechief decision,' the lack of a formal
assumption of jurisdiction by the state pursuant to the only con-
gressionally approved method is fatal to an assertion of state
jurisdiction over the Indian country within Oklahoma.
C. General limitations on the scope or exercise of tribal powers
Tribal self-governing powers have been limited in their scope or
their exercise in a number of ways. Since Worcester v. Georgia,"
the national government has been vested by the Constitution with
paramount authority over Indian affairs and through Congress ex-
ercises broad dominion over tribal matters. Implicit in this judicial
doctrine is the recognition that Congress in its plenary role has the
authority to limit, alter, curtail, or expand tribal powers of self-
government. In addition, the tribe may self-impose limits on the
exercise of its inherent powers, often unwittingly.
Not unlike the fashion in which supplementary powers are
vested in tribal governments, limitations on the scope or exercise
of tribal powers fall into several categories. First, there are limiting
acts which are of general application, such as the Trader Regula-
tion Acts,3' wherein the Commissioner of Indian Affairs is vested
with exclusive authority to license and appoint traders with the In-
dian tribes. Another example is the Major Crimes Act,32 which ex-
tends the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the crimes of murder,
manslaughter, rape, statutory rape, assault with intent to commit
rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burgla-
ry, robbery, and larceny when committed by Indians within the
Indian country.
Second, there are federal statutes that apply to particular tribes
that limit or extinguish tribal powers. For instance, the Klamath
Termination Act33 terminated the federal relationship with the
Kiamath Tribe and also with the Modoc Tribe in Oklahoma.
Other examples are the Oklahoma Organic Act and the Curtis
Act, to be discussed in another section.
Third, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,-" the Indian Bill of
28. State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1978).
29. Id. See also Kennerly v. District Ct., 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
30. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
31. Act of Aug. 15,1876, ch. 289, 5 5, 19 Stat. 200, codifiedat25 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
32. 25 U.S.C. 5 1153 (1970).
33. 25 U.S.C. §§ 564a-64w (1970).
34. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 94-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).
Rights, limits the exercise of tribal sovereignty by making official
tribal action subject to substantial parts of the Bill of Rights to the
United States. This represents a radical limitation on tribal power.
For instance, under the prior law enunciated in Talton v. Mayes,35
the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment was not ap-
plicable to the official criminal proceedings of the Cherokee Na-
tion because the inherent sovereign powers of Indian tribes were
not created by nor subject to the Constitution. Similarly, in the
Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council,' the Court
held that the first amendment was not applicable to the Navajo
Tribe, and further that the federal court was without jurisdiction
over tribal laws even though they might have some impact on
forms of religious worship. This expression of prior law was
grounded on the concept of original sovereignty. Whether ap-
propriate or not, the advent of the Indian Civil Rights Act marks a
fundamental limitation on tribal power.
Fourth, tribes may, by affirmative restrictions or inadvertent
omissions, limit the scope and exercise of their tribal powers. For
instance, a tribal constitution may affirmatively limit the tribal
powers. Or the tribe may consciously decide not to exercise one of
the fundamental tribal powers, such as maintaining a tribal
judiciary, because of budgetary constraints. More commonly,
tribal constitutional limitations on the exercise of tribal powers are
due more to an omission or oversight rather than a deliberate sift-
ing process. These omissions can arise because of many cir-
cumstances, such as lack of information or disinterest in tribal
powers by the personnel involved in preparation of the document.
In the Oklahoma context, Cohen stated:
Under this act a considerable number of the Oklahoma
tribes have adopted tribal constitutions and obtained cor-
porate charters.
These constitutions and charters differ in several respects
from those adopted by tribes of other states. For one thing,
the substantive powers of the tribe are set forth in the
charters, rather than in constitutions. The constitutions are
restricted to such topics as membership and tribal organiza-
tion. Another important characteristic of the Oklahoma
tribal constitution and charters is that none of them contain
the broad police and judicial powers found in many other
tribal documents."
35. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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The clear implication of the above quoted passage is that the tribes
in Oklahoma have .taken too narrow a view of existing tribal
powers.
In conclusion, Congress alone is vested with authority to alter
or curtail tribal powers. (The states occupy no significant position
in this structuring of powers without the consent of Congress.)
Limitations on tribal power may happen only through (1) federal
statutes of general application limiting all tribal governments
unless exempted, (2) federal statutes specifically applicable to a
particular tribe, and (3) through self-imposed limitations occa-
sioned by affirmative determinations by the tribe not to exercise
power, or by tribal inadvertence.
D. What is an Indian Tribe?
The question of whether an Indian tribe exists as a sovereign en-
tity with governmental powers or as a voluntary association of
persons sharing a common ethnic background, much like a non-
profit corporation, was recently addressed by the federal courts at
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals level and later by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Mazurie.'
In the Tenth Circuit, the court which also hears appeals of
federal cases arising in Oklahoma, erroneously stated:
The issue is also raised on the fundamental question of the
authority of the Government or of the Tribes to regulate the
defendants' business in a way that a failure to conform con-
stitutes a crime. As indicated above, we are concerned with a
business operating at a fixed place and legal under Wyoming
laws. This business would have also been legal, under the
Government's theory, if defendants had a license from the
Wind River Tribes. The Government has thus delegated to
the Tribes the unrestricted power to determine whether the
operation of defendants' business constitutes a federal crime
or not ....
If the Government has the power to regulate a business on
the land it granted in fee without restrictions, which we
doubt, it cannot delegate the power above described to the
Tribes. There is no theory of sovereignty or governmental
subdivision which would support such a delegation.
The Tribes have the usual powers of an owner of land, to
the extent of such ownership, over those using their lands.
38. 419 U.S. 544 (1975), revg487 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1973).
This power is often confused with some elements of
6overeignty when large tracts are involved, and when only
the relationship between a Tribe and the Government is ex-
amined. The decisions relating to the sovereignty of certain
tribes are in the context of relationships between a Tribe and
the federal or state government ....
The tribal members are citizens of the United States. It is
difficult to see how such an association of citizens could exer-
cise any degree of governmental authority or sovereignty
over other citizens who do not belong, and who cannot par-
ticipate in any way in the tribal organization. The situation is
in no way comparable to a city, county, or special district
under state laws. There cannot be such a separate "nation" of
United States citizens within the boundaries of the United
States which has any authority, other than as landowners,
over individuals who are excluded as members.
The purported delegation of authority to the tribal officials
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1161 is therefore invalid. Congress
Cannot delegate its authority to a private, voluntary
organization, which is obviously not a governmental agency,
lo regulate a business on privately owned lands, no matter
where located."
A unanimous Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Rehn-
quist, reversed the lower court, and on the "voluntary associa-
tion" versus governmental entity status of Indian tribal govern-
ments, unequivocally stated:
This Court has recognized limits on the authority of Con-
gress to delegate its legislative power .... Those limitations
are, however, less stringent in cases where the entity exercis-
ing the delegated authority itself possesses independent
authority over the subject matter .... Thus it is an important
aspect of this case that Indian tribes are unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members
and their territory, they are "a separate people" possessing
"the power of regulating their internal and social
relations.... "
Cases such as Worcester and Kagama, surely establish the
proposition that Indian tribes within "Indian country" are a
good deal more than "private, voluntary organizations," and
39. 487 F.2d at 18-19.
they thus undermine the rationale of the Court of Appeals'
decision .... [Citations omitted. ]'
Indian tribes' power as governments is the most basic element of
Indian law. Virtually all of the federally recognized Indian tribes
in Oklahoma have been determined to "perform substantial
governmental functions" as a prerequisite to entitlement for the
general revenue sharing funds authorized under the state and local
Assistance Act of 1972."
Review of Significant Legal Events Affecting
Tribal Powers by Geographic Area and Time Periods
A. The Treaty Period, Pre-1890
The designations of "eastern Oklahoma tribes" and "western
Oklahoma tribes" are more than a mere geographical description,
and the designations are more than a mere categorical description
of the tribes served by the Bureau of Indian Affairs Area Offices in
Anadarko and Muskogee. These designations flow from the dif-
fering legal status of these general groupings of tribes after the In-
dian Territory was divided into two separate governmental areas,
the formally organized Territory of Oklahoma and the unorgan-
ized Indian Territory. At least two separations of thought are
necessary. One relates to geographical separation because of dif-
ferent legal treatment of the tribal governments after 1890 in
Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory. The second relates to a
separation of the legal concepts of power to govern and the area
in which these powers may be exercised.
The Territory of Oklahoma came into being in 1890 pursuant to
the Oklahoma Organic Act.'2 The total purpose for the formation
of the Oklahoma Territory was to provide a government for the
non-Indian settlers within the Territory of Oklahoma after the
land run of 1889. It was not intended that the Indians were to
become subject to the territorial government.' Congress accorded
the Indian tribal governments in the Oklahoma Territory one kind
of legal treatment, and the Indian tribal governments in the Indian
Territory an almost entirely different legal treatment.
The Indian tribal governments in the Indian Territory were left
intact by Congress' actions prior to 1890. However, the period of
40. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
41. Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (1972).
42. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81 (1890).
43. 21 CONG. REc. 2176 (1890).
1890-1907, including such significant legal events as the creation
of the Territory of Oklahoma, the Dawes Commission formation
to individualize the tribal holdings of the Five Civilized Tribes, the
extension of the laws of Arkansas over the Indian Territory, the
Curtis Act in 1898 abolishing the existing tribal courts of the Five
Civilized Tribes, the 1906 Act providing for the dissolution of the
tribal governments of the Five Civilized Tribes and, finally, the
admission of Oklahoma into the Union, brought into serious ques-
tion the continued national existence of the various Indian tribes
in what remained of the Indian Territory. In the Oklahoma Ter-
ritory, with minor exceptions, the pattern emerged as a severe
diminishment of the tribal land base, ordinarily known as Indian
country, with only minor extinguishment of tribal governmental
powers or structures.
In other words, the Indian tribal governments in the Oklahoma
Territory, in terms of legal authority to govern, experienced little
diminishment by the major legal events of the era, but the land
area within which these governmental powers are exercisable-In-
dian country-was severely limited by the allotment and cession
agreements entered into by and between the Indian tribes and the
United States.
In contrast, Indian tribes within the Indian Territory (eastern
Oklahoma) were stripped of specific governmental structures and
functions leaving the Indian country subject to their jurisdiction
relatively intact. In other words, the land area within which the
Indian Territory tribes could exercise their governmental powers
experienced little diminishment in the allotment process, but much
of their existing governmental structure was specifically abolished
or rendered ineffective by Congress.
Any consideration of the governmental authority of the Indian
tribes of Oklahoma as they exist today thus demands a basic
understanding of the sequential legal events leading to the forma-
tion of the state of Oklahoma.
Period Prior to 1890
Prior to 1890, thirty-three Indian tribes had been settled within
the geographical area which would become the state of
Oklahoma. These tribes, removed from all across the United
States, retained all the governmental power and authority of In-
dian tribes in general.4 There were no competitors for governmen-
44. SeeUnited States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
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tal power because no organized territorial government existed,
and the body of the area was Indian country as defined in an 1834
Act as "that part of the United States west of the Mississippi" not
within certain states "to which Indian title has not been extin-
guished. '4
The Indian tribes presently in Oklahoma, in their recognized
capacity as domestic, dependent nations, 6 exercised undiminished
tribal power over undiminished Indian country prior to 1890. In
1889, the "unassigned lands" comprising that area around what is
now Oklahoma City, were opened to entry and settlement. The
area was soon flooded with white settlers and the demands for
some form of government for these non-Indian residents resulted
in the passage of the Oklahoma Organic Act.' Within seventeen
years, the state of Oklahoma would be admitted into the Union.
The legal effect on tribal governments of the statutes which paved
the way to statehood is of controlling importance in determining
the current legal status of these Indian tribes.
B. The Critical Era-1890-1907
The period from 1890-1907 is the most legally significant, yet
analytically vague, era for Indian tribal governments within the
state of Oklahoma. The attitude of state officials about this era,
over the years, is perhaps best expressed by a 1953 letter from
Johnston Murray, Governor of Oklahoma, replying to a sugges-
tion by Orme Lewis, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, that the
Governor meet with the Indian tribes in Oklahoma regarding state
assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country
in Oklahoma pursuant to Public Law 280.4 Governor Murray
stated:
When Oklahoma became a State, all tribal governments
within its boundaries became merged in the State and the
tribal codes under which the tribes were governed prior to
Statehood were abandoned and all Indian tribes, with respect
to criminal offenses and civil causes, came under State
jurisdiction.
Therefore, Public Law No. 280 will not in any way affect
the Indian citizens of this State.
45. Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877).
46. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
47. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81 (1890).
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Although this perspective can only be characterized as an expres-
sion of faith, the state of Oklahoma has regarded Governor Mur-
ray's viewpoint as the final comment on the "Oklahoma Indians."
The noncritical acceptance of this view by federal officials and
others involved in the affairs of the Indian tribes residing in
Oklahoma has resulted in stunted, ineffective tribal governments
which currently exercise only a fraction of the governing authority
with which they are vested.
Contrasting the simplistic view of Governor Murray is that of
the prime authority in the field of Indian law, Felix Cohen, who
has stated that, "The laws governing the Indians in Oklahoma are
so numerous that analysis of them would require a treatise in
itself."'" The American Indian Policy Review Commission found it
impossible to devote the necessary time to this study and sug-
gested a separately funded congressional study to develop a ra-
tional policy for the Indian tribes in Oklahoma. '
Each of the Indian tribes in Oklahoma exercised all the power
and authority of a dependent, domestic nation prior to 1890, thus
being on an equal or superior footing with the general status of In-
dian tribes across the United States. At this point, the only com-
petitor of the tribe in the field of governing power was the federal
government, whose power, when it chose to exercise it, was short-
ly to become recognized by the Supreme Court as plenary."
Beginning in 1890, the Oklahoma Enabling Act 2 established a
second competitor for the governing authority of a portion of
these Indian tribes, Le., Oklahoma Territory. The Oklahoma
Enabling Act carved Oklahoma Territory out of the "Indian Ter-
ritory" by providing:
That all that portion of the United States now known as
the Indian Territory, except so much of the same as is actual-
ly occupied by the Five Civilized Tribes, and the Indian tribes
within the Quapaw Indian Agency, and except the unoc-
cupied part of the Cherokee Outlet, together with that por-
tion of the United States known as the Public Land Strip
[Oklahoma Panhandle] is hereby erected into a temporary
government by the name of the Territory of Oklahoma-.
and further: "whenever the interest of the Cherokee Indians in the
49. COHEN, supra note 1, at 455.
50. FINAL REPORT TO AMERICAN INDIAN Poucy REVIEW COMM-N, FEDERAL, STATE AND
TRIBAL JURISDICTION 120 (1976).
51. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 552 (1903).
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land known as the Cherokee Outlet shall have been extinguished
and the President shall make proclamation thereof, said outlet
shall thereupon, and without further legislation, become a part of
the Territory of Oklahoma."' 3 Congressional action thus created a
distinction which would later have important legal significance
between the balance of the Indian tribes in what is now the state of
Oklahoma, and the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw,
Seminole, Quapaw, Seneca, Ottawa, Wyandotte, Modoc,
Cayuga, Peoria, and Miami tribes.
Although the lands of the Quapaw subagency and Five Civil-
ized Tribes were officially designated as Indian Territory, no ter-
ritorial government was created which embraced their lands.'
Thus, it is these tribes, and only these tribes, which were subject to
the later legislation affecting the Indian Territory.
The lands of the balance of the tribes in what is now Oklahoma,
the Kansas (Kaw), Absentee Shawnee, Wichita, Caddo,
Delaware, Kiowa, Comanche, Apache, Cheyenne, Arapaho,
Citizens Band Pottawatomie, Fort Sill Apache, Kickapoo, Otoe-
Missouria, Iowa, Pawnee, Ponca, Tonkawa, Sac and Fox, and the
Osage, were encompassed in the newly created Territory of
Oklahoma. It was these tribes, then, for which a second direct
competitor for governmental power was created by the Organic
Act.
1. Oklahoma Territory Tribes
The first 28 sections of the Enabling Act ordain and establish the
government for the Territory of Oklahoma, while the balance of
the Act contains provisions applicable to what was designated as
Indian Territory. Both the face of the Act and its legislative
history indicate that the establishment of Oklahoma Territory was
not meant to compromise the governing authority of the tribes
located therein to any significant degree. The first section of the
Act contains the familiar proviso:
Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to
impair any right now pertaining to any Indians or Indian
tribe in said Territory under the laws, agreements, and
treaties of the United States, or to impair the rights of person
or property pertaining to said Indians, or to affect the
authority of the Government of the United States to make
53. Id. at 82.
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any regulation or to make any law respecting said Indians,
their lands, property, or other rights which it would have
been competent to make or enact if this act had not been
passed."
Other than this proviso, the only section of the Act dealing with
Indian rights and the powers of tribal government is Section 12,
originally drafted as Section 8 of the bill. Originally the section
was much more restricted in the class which was granted access to
the federal courts, limiting access only to members of the Indian
tribes.
In its final form, Section 12 provided:
That jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the district
courts in the Territory of Oklahoma over all controversies
arising between members or citizens of one tribe or nation of
Indians and the members or citizens of other tribes or nations
in the Territory of Oklahoma, and any citizen or member of
one tribe or nation who may commit any offense or crime in
said Territory against the person or property of a citizen or
member of another tribe or nation shall be subject to the
same punishment in the Territory as he would be if both par-
ties were citizens of the United States; and any person
residing in the Territory of Oklahoma, in whom there is In-
dian blood, shall have the right to invoke the aid of courts
therein for the protection of his person or property, as
though he were a citizen of the United States: Provided, That
nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to give
jurisdiction to the courts established in said Territory in con-
troversies between Indians of the same tribe, while sustaining
their tribal relations.'
This section is unique in its approach to the jurisdictional status
of the territory. All other jurisdictional statutes of the period
delineated the territorial limits of federal and tribal jurisdiction by
limiting such jurisdiction to the reservation,' (later changed to
"Indian country"),' or to Indian country." Generally, if an Indian
against Indian offense or transaction occurs outside Indian coun-
try, no special Indian interest is involved, and Congress has not
55. Id.,§1.
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reserved federal jurisdiction over the subject matter, then the ter-
ritorial or state court has jurisdiction over the subject. Section 12
is unique in that while it provides an opportunity for actions in-
volving members of different tribes to be litigated in the federal
court, it is not mandatory and jurisdiction was withheld over all
matters involving members of the same tribe, not merely while in
the Indian country, but while sustaining their tribal relations. The
legislative history of the Act supports the proposition that the ter-
ritorial government was not designed or meant to have any effect
on the governing authority of the tribes located within the ter-
ritory. Congressman Mansur clearly stated the intent of the Act
thus:
I challenge any gentleman on this floor-I care not who he
is-to take any one of the first 24 sections of this bill and
show where it touches a red man at all. I repeat, for I would
like to have it understood, that the first 24 sections of this bill
do not relate to a red man or to a tribe, do not relate to the
Indians in any manner whatever. The first 24 sections relate
to white men only, of whom there are 200,000 in that Ter-
ritory now asking for law and order and legislation
.... Now, as to every Indian reservation within the whole
limits of the Indian Territory as now organized, we say ex-
pressly that those first 24 sections of the act thus organizing
this Territorial government shall not apply. Remember,
gentlemen, we say in plain, clear language that, as to every
Indian tribe and as to the land of every Indian tribe, none of
these 24 sections which apply to white people shall operate.'
In 1890, at the time of these debates, none of the Indian tribes in
the territory had been allotted, and all of the tribes enjoyed
cllassical reservation status. Thus, Congressman Mansur's remarks
indicate that the Act was intended to provide a government for
those white persons legally within the area and to leave the reser-
vations completely under the control of the tribes. The white per-
sons legally within the area were concentrated around present-day
Oklahoma City in the unassigned lands which had been opened by
the run of 1889, and in the Panhandle. That the territorial effect of
the government being established was limited to these "opened
areas," is stated in the record:
Mr. Mansur: The whole effect, then, of our legislation is
simply to take out of the existing condition a certain small
60. 21 CONG. REC. 2176 (1890).
territory, 2,000,000 acres in one place [lands opened by the
run of 18891 and a little more than 3,000,000 acres in No
Man's Land [the present Oklahoma Panhandle], in all less
than 6,000,000 acres, and to put this much territory under
the control of white men when their Territorial Legislature
shall be organized ....
Mr. Oates: Will the gentlemen kindly state the number of
square miles embraced in this Territory?
Mr. Mansur: There are between 22,000,000 and 23,000,000
acres ......
The balance of the area, the approximately 17,000,000 acres of
the Indian reservations was intended to remain under the control
of the federal government and the tribes. Any argument that this
Act extinguished the reservation status enjoyed by any of the
tribes physically embraced in Oklahoma Territory, that their
governmental authority was infringed, or that the Territory of
Oklahoma acquired jurisdiction over them was explicitly rejected:
Mr. Mansur: Is the gentleman aware that the laws of the
United States in full force today make it a criminal offense to
take intoxicating liquor into the reservation of any Indians?
Mr. Turner: But I suggest to the gentleman that this is no
longer a reservation, but a Territory.
Mr. Mansur: But I desire to remind the gentleman that, as
this bill expressly declares, This Territorial government or
organization is not for any Indian reservation whatever: it
does not apply to Indian reservations.62
The Enabling Act taken in the sense most destructive of tribal
jurisdiction within the Oklahoma Territory resulted in no
diminishment of the tribal land base or change in reservation
status. The Indian country subject to the jurisdiction of the tribes
in western Oklahoma was not at all changed by the Act. Likewise,
the governing authority of the tribes in western Oklahoma was
left completely intact. Even presuming the most adverse inter-
pretation of Section 12 (originally Section 8), this section simply
extends to those of Indian blood a nonmandatory right to appeal
to the federal courts to protect their persons or property when the
dispute involved only members or citizens of different tribes or na-
tions. The jurisdiction thus granted to the federal courts vis a vis
the tribal court is analogous to federal diversity jurisdiction vis a
61. Id.
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vis the state courts, taking no power or jurisdiction away from the
tribe, but simply allowing nonmembers and noncitizens to appeal
to the federal courts if the individual concerned felt that he would
be better protected there. The effect of Section 12 is described by
Congressman Hooker as he proposed an amendment opening the
federal courts to anyone of Indian blood:
It was said in debate the other day by the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Springer] that the Indians themselves had given
their assent to this proposition. As I understand from them
their assent was given by their attorneys, to the proposition
that any Indian embraced in the Territory of Oklahoma
might appeal, as a citizen of the United States would appeal,
to the courts, thus established for protection or for the deter-
mination of his rights. It was not intended to apply nor was
the concession made as to any tribe....
There will be Indians embraced in the Territory under the
8th section [now Section 12], probably, and if the courts are
established and this bill passes, they will have the right when
they hold relations with the Indian tribes under their
law .... It does not refer to the tribes, but to such Indians as
may be there and to white citizens who hold relations with
the Indians, and they ought to be allowed to invoke the pro-
tection of the courts."
2. The Allotment Acts
The most catastrophic event of the era affecting the jurisdiction
or power of tribes in western Oklahoma was the allotment in
severalty of the lands of the various tribes. With the possible ex-
ception of the Osage Nation, the allotment acts had no detrimen-
tal effect on the authority or power of the tribal governments to
govern. The allotment acts, rather, impacted on the territorial
area over which the tribal government could exert its influence.
There were two basic methods by which the common holdings
ol the reservations were allotted in severalty. One such method
was to allot the tribes under the provisions of the General Allot-
ment Act." The Otoe and Ponca tribes were allotted under the
provisions of this Act, and many other tribal allotments of the
various tribes in western Oklahoma were, by special allotment
agreements, held "in trust for the allottees, respectively, for the
63. 21 CONG. REC. 2177 (1890) (emphasis added).
64. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 199, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
period of 25 years, in the manner and to the extent provided for in
the [General Allotment Act]."'
The General Allotment Act did not speak to the governing
power of the tribe. The General Allotment Act is a property act
and only speaks to which sovereign (tribe or state) will have
jurisdiction over the allottees and allotted property. Section 6 of
the Act provided:
That upon the completion of said allotments and the pat-
enting of the lands to said allottees, each and every member
of the respective bands or tribes of Indians to whom
allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and be
subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or
Territory in which they may reside: and no Territory shall
pass or enforce any law denying any such Indian within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.'
For many years it was thought that this Act subjected the allot-
tees to the jurisdiction of the state or territory as soon as the trust
patents had issued and this view was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court.67 However, this viewpoint was called into ques-
tion' and finally overruled in United States v. Nice.' In Nice the
Supreme Court stated that the actions of Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch after the passage of the Act had clearly indicated
that the federal government had intended to retain jurisdiction un-
til the title to the allotments had been vested in the allottees in fee
simple. That the provisions of the General Allotment Act neither
terminated the reservations nor subjected the allottees to state
jurisdiction was emphasized by the 1906 amendment to the
General Allotment Act, more commonly known as the Burke Act:
Sec. 5. That at the expiration of the trust period and when the
lands have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee, as
provided in section five of this Act, then each and every
allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws,
both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which
they may reside; ... Provided further, That until the issuance
of fee simple patents all allottees to whom trust patents shall
65. Act of Mar. 3,1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989 (1891) (Cheyenne and Arapahoe Allotment
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hereafter be issued shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States.7"
Thus, the provisions of the General Allotment Act has no effect
on the power of the tribes to govern and only subjects the
allotments to state jurisdiction once the land is taken out of trust
status and the title is vested in the allottee in fee simple absolute.
Therefore, the individual allotment agreements of the various
tribes must be considered in the attempt to determine the limita-
tions which may or may not have been imposed on the tribes.
With the exception of the Osages, research reveals no allotment
agreement between the United States and any tribe in western
Oklahoma (Oklahoma Territory) which modifies or limits the
powers of the tribal governments. However, the territory in which
these powers could be exercised was, at least in some cases,
drastically altered. The allotment agreements of the western tribes
can be broken down into four basic categories. These categories
a e:
A. Allotment and Cession agreements (wherein the tribe did)
cede, convey, transfer, relinquish and surrender forever and
absolutely without any reservation whatever, express or im-
plied, all their claim, title, and interest of every kind and
character, in and to the lands embraced in the following
described tract of country.... "
B. Allotment and Cession Agreements with exceptions:
There shall be excepted from the operation of this agreement
a tract of land ... [which]... shall belong to said Iowa Tribe
of Indians in common so long as they use the same.., for
their... Tribe....
That in addition to the allotment of lands to said Indians as pro-
vided for in this agreement, the Secretary of the Interior shall set
aside for the use in common for said Indian tribes four hundred
and eighty thousand acres of grazing lands to be selected by the
Secretary of the Interior ......
C. Allotment Agreements with limited cessions: Sec. 2. All
70. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, § 5, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (emphasis added).
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lands belonging to said Kansas and Kaw Tribes of Indians
located in the Territory of Oklahoma, except as herein pro-
vided, shall be divided among the members of said tribe, giv-
ing to each his or her fair share thereof, in acres, as
follows ... Sec. 7. There shall be set aside and reserved from
selection or allotment one hundred and sixty (160) acres of
land, including the school and agency buildings, to conform
to the public survey, which said one hundred and sixty (160)
acres of land said tribe cedes to the United States.74
D. Allotments in severalty without cessions: Sec. 2. That all
lands belonging to the Osage Tribe of Indians in Oklahoma
Territory, except as herein provided, shall be divided among
the members of said tribe, giving to each his or her fair share
thereof in acres, as follows .... 75
Although the effect of these four types of allotment proceedings
is anything but clear, the following generalizations can be made,
subject to revision as the distinct circumstances surrounding the
allotment and the legislative history of the particular acts affecting
the various tribes impact on the wording of the acts.
As to those tribes without allotment agreements allotted under
the provisions of the General Allotment Act, the tribal power and
authority were left totally intact. However, the reservation boun-
daries of the Otoe, Missouria, and Ponca reservations were
abolished by a specific statute in 1904.6 Thus, the territorial
jurisdiction of these tribes is now limited to areas where the nature
of the area, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to the
tribe and the federal government, and the practice of government
agencies toward the area establish it as a dependent Indian com-
munity,7 and to all the allotments which are still held in trust by
the United States. "
As to those tribes with allotment and cession agreements, the
tribal power and authority were left intact. There has, however,
been no definitive pronouncement by Congress or the Supreme
74. Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1361, 32 Stat. 636 (1902) (congressional ratification of an
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Court as to the reservation status. The reservation of the
Oklahoma Kickapoo Tribe was determined to be extinguished
within the meaning of the statutes requiring the consent of the
Secretary of the Interior to the use of rights of way across Indian
reservations for electric lines.7" Additionally, the Kiowa, Coman-
che, Apache, and Cheyenne-Arapaho reservations have been
judicially determined to be extinguished by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the cases of Tooisgah v. United State? and
Ellis v. Page." Since the reasoning of the circuit court has been
undermined by the recent Supreme Court rulings, a Supreme
Court determination on an individual basis will be necessary to
finally determine the issue. The question for each of the allotment
and cession tribes will be whether the surrounding circumstances
and legislative history establish an intent on the part of Congress
to continue the reservation status in a manner sufficient to over-
come the cession language which was determined to be "precisely
suited to [extinguishment]."'
However, DeCoteau v. District Court" establishes that not-
withstanding reservation extinguishment and abolition of the
reservation boundaries, the federal government and the tribe re-
tain exclusive jurisdiction over the allotments until Indian title
(trust status) is extinguished. The Court stated: "It is common
ground here that Indian conduct occurring on the trust allotments
is beyond the State's jurisdiction, being instead the proper concern
of tribal or federal authorities."'
Thus, even should the reservation extinguishment issue be final-
ly determined adversely to the tribe, the tribe will retain full
governmental power and authority over the dependent Indian
communities associated with the tribe and all trust allotments in-
cluding rights of way running through them.'
The governing authority of those tribes which have specific
areas of land excepted from the operation of their allotment
agreements is the same as that of the other tribes in western
Oklahoma. Likewise, the area within which they can exercise their
governing authority is subject to the same considerations re-
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garding allotments as listed in the paragraph directly above.
However, the allotment agreements of these tribes present one fur-
ther issue which apparently has not been previously litigated. This
issue is the effect of the provisions of the allotment act excepting
certain tribal lands from operation.
This question has never been squarely presented to a court.
However, under the common rules of statutory construction, it
would appear that the particular areas reserved from the cession
would constitute a diminished Indian reservation. 7 Thus, the
tribes would retain jurisdiction over these diminished reservations
notwithstanding the legal status of the current landowner as In-
dian or non-Indian or the status of the land as trust or nontrust.88
One of the greatest ironies in the saga of the allotment of the
tribes in the Territory of Oklahoma may be that of the Kansas or
Kaw Tribe. The Kaw essentially allotted themselves by drafting an
allotment agreement and submitting it to Congress. The draft as
approved by Congress, 9 simply calls for a division of the tribal
land and funds. There is no general cession language anywhere
within the Act, the only cession to the United States being a
specific cession of the 160-acre tract upon which the school and
agency buildings were located. Under the rule for determining
whether a reservation is extinguished, propounded by the
Supreme Court in DeCoteau, the reservation boundaries clearly
remained intact, with the exception of the 160-acre tract, after the
allotment. The irony is that the Kaw, in the aftermath of the allot-
ment era, retain jurisdictional authority over their reservation and
yet there appear to be no allotments remaining in trust status, and
the tribe only owns 20 acres of land. However, it should be em-
phasized that this result is not due to any oversight or mistake on
the part of Congress. It is simply the result of a congressional
policy to provide for the allotment of the tribes within the Ter-
ritory of Oklahoma.
The circumstances surrounding the Osage Nation have com-
bined to produce a unique legal entity among the Indian tribes in
Oklahoma. From 1881, the Osage had governed themselves by a
written constitution and laws. The constitution of the Osage Na-
tion was ordained and established pursuant to the inherent gov-
erning power of the Great and Little Osages and provided for a
tripartite government with a legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. The legislative power was vested in the National Coun-
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cil, the executive power in the Principal Chief, and the judicial
power was vested in a supreme court.' The laws of the Osage Na-
tion were codified in 18 articles covering such topics as Estates and
Administrators, Attorneys, Crimes and Punishments, Sheriffs, In-
termarriage With and Jurisdiction Over White Men, Civil Pro-
cedure, and Taxation.' Self-government under this constitution
and laws continued until 1900. Then, in one of the most absolutely
amazing documents rescued from the oblivion of the allotment
era, the Department of the Interior, by administrative fiat,
abolished the constitutional Osage tribal government.'
The report of the Commissioner stated:
Abolishment of the Osage Tribal Government
A crisis in Osage governmental affairs was reached in the
election of tribal officers in 1898. After a bitter factional con-
troversy, and after an investigation had been conducted by
Inspector McLaughlin, the Department, on February 21,
1899, decided the contest in favor of Black Dog, representing
the full-blood, element as principal chief, and Ma shah ke tah,
the candidate of the progressive or mixed-blood party, as
assistant principal chief. The Osages, however, became in-
volved in another dispute over the election of members of the
national council, which was only settled by the Department
order of January 18, 1900, recognizing twelve members as
having been duly elected and constituting a quorum of the
council, leaving three vacancies to be filled by that body.
These and other considerations impelled the office, on
February 21, 1900, to recommend the issuance of a Depart-
mental order abolishing the Osage national government, ex-
cepting the national council and the offices of principal chief.
Such an order was issued March 30. May 19, the office
recommended the abolishment of the national council which
was ordered by the Department May 21, 1900.
The principal causes that led to the abolition of the Osage
tribal government were: (1) Acrimonious disputes between
the two factions over elections; (2) entire absence of harmony
between the Osage tribal officers and the Indian agent in the
administration of tribal affairs; (3) the selection of ignorant
men as officeholders, and (4) the profligate use of moneys
received from permit taxes.
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The tribal government was abolished after the conditions
had been fully investigated by a special Indian agent and
after the facts developed in his investigation had been
carefully considered by this office and the Department. It
was determined upon as the wisest step to take, in view of the
tangle into which the affairs of the Osage Nation had gotten.
It has resulted in the reduction of expenses and consequently
a considerable saving to the tribe in the amounts heretofore
expended for salaries of a long list of tribal officials.
The Osage constitution provided that the National Council was
to be the judge of the qualifications of its members, determine its
own rules of procedure, choose its own officers, and that "the
returns of the elections for Principal Chief shall be sealed up and
directed to the President of the National Council, who shall open
and publish them in the presence of the Council assembled. The
person having the highest number of votes shall be Principal
Chief .... "" From the offhand manner in which the Commis-
sioner indicates that the Department "decided the contest" and set-
tled the later dispute "by the Department order," it seems clear
that the Bureau of Indian Affairs was completely comfortable in
interfering with the constitutional processes of the Osages. With
no authority of law, the Commissioner proceeded not only to
bypass the constitutional government of the Osages, but to ter-
minate its activities. The principal causes of this action might well
be translated as
(1) two elections hotly contested by the Republican and
Democratic parties necessitating a recount; (2) a very strong sense
of self-determination on the part of the Osage leadership; (3) true
democracy at work by placing men in office who represent the
view of the Osage citizens as opposed to that of agents of the
United States; (4) the Commissioner's personal tax revolt within
Osage country.
This situation-abolition of a constitutional tribal government
by administrative fiat without legal foundation-was described by
a federal district judge as "bureaucratic imperialism" in the recent
case of Harjo v. Kleppe," involving a similar situation with the
Creek Nation.
This ultra vires action of the Commissioner remained in effect
from 1900 until 1906. During this period, the Principal Chief was
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the only spokesman of the Osage National Council recognized by
the Department. However, in the 1906 Osage Allotment Act,
Congress provided for the election of a Principal and Assistant
Principal Chief and an eight-member tribal council as follows:
Sec. 9. That there shall be a biennial election of officers for
the Osage tribe as follows: A principal chief, an assistant
principal chief, and eight members of the Osage tribal coun-
cil, to succeed the officers elected in the year nineteen hun-
dred and six, said officers to be elected at a general election to
be held in the town of Pawhuska, Oklahoma Territory, on
the first Monday in June; and the first election for said of-
ficers shall be held on the first Monday in June, nineteen hun-
dred and eight, in the manner to be prescribed by the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, and said officers shall be elected
for a period of two years, commencing on the first day of Ju-
ly following said election, and in case of a vacancy in the of-
fice of principal chief, by death, resignation, or otherwise,
the assistant principal chief shall succeed to said office, and
all vacancies in the Osage tribal council shall be filled in a
manner to be prescribed by the Osage tribal council, and the
Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to remove from
the council any member or members thereof for good cause,
to be by him determined."
It is clear that the statutory tribal council was organized to control
the commonly held tribal mineral estate." A recent case, Logan v.
Andrus,' held that the action of the Secretary of the Interior in
1900 abolishing the tribal government was illegal, thus confirming
the 1881 Osage constitution and the laws passed pursuant thereto
as the governing law within the Osage Nation. It is then apparent
that the Section 9 statutory tribal council, as successors to the con-
stitutional tribal council, have retained the powers delegated to it
by Congress as well as those inherent powers delegated to the
tribal council by the Osage constitution.
As noted above, the Osage reservation was simply allotted with
no land cessions made to the United States. While numerous cases
hold that such areas as Osage allotments" and public highways
within Osage County" remained Indian country after the allot-
9.5. Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, § 9, 34 Stat. 539 (1906).
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ment act and the admission of Oklahoma into the Union, no
judicial determination has been made regarding the present ex-
istence of the Osage Reservation."° Under the present test ex-
pounded by the Supreme Court in DeCoteau and Kneip, there is
no reason to believe that the Osage Reservation has been
diminished or extinguished. Clearly, all Osage allotments still
restricted and all of the Osage villages, such as Grey Horse, con-
tinue to be Indian country."2 For the Osage Tribe, this era marked
the end of major federal legislation which affected tribal govern-
ment. The other tribes within the Territory of Oklahoma would
be markedly aided in exercising their governmental functions by a
series of congressional acts beginning in the 1930's.
3. Indian Territory Tribes
An understanding of the status of the Five Civilized Tribes prior
to 1890 is critical to an understanding of the final result of the
legislation of this period dealing with the Indian Territory. Prior
to 1890, the Five Civilized Tribes had occupied a leadership posi-
tion in the struggle for tribal self-determination. During the
1800's, for example, the Cherokee Nation repeatedly resorted to
the federal courts in attempts to prevent or limit incursion upon its
authority by the state or federal government."° The Cherokee Na-
tion, now in Oklahoma, was described as a "domestic dependent
nation" by Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia." The constitutional governments of the Five Civilized
Tribes prior to the 1890-1907 era affirmatively exercised all the in-
herent powers of internal self-government as a matter of right,
resisting any intrusion into their internal self-government by the
state or federal governments, willingly acquiescing only in federal
control of their foreign relations.
These governments have been recognized as well organized, ef-
fective sovereigns:
They maintained complete governments .... They had their
own schools, their own legislative assemblies, their own
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courts. And they did the job well. Under all the conditions
they made a record which would have been creditable to any
municipality or state in this country.''
The Creek or Muskogee Nation or Tribe of Indians had, in
1890, a population of 15,000. Subject to the control of Con-
gress, they then exercised within a definite territory the
powers of a sovereign people; having a tribal organization,
their own system of laws, and a government with the usual
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial. The territory
was divided into six districts; and each district was provided
with a judge."
This long heritage of legal resistance to incursions by the state
or federal governments into the internal affairs of the Five Civil-
ized Tribes was in marked contrast to the domination of the tribes
in western Oklahoma by the military. While the tribes in western
Oklahoma were attempting to overcome the effects of their recent
seventy years of warfare, thus lacking a long tradition of politico-
legal battles, the wars of the Five Tribes occurred primarily
between the years of 1520-1780. In the period between 1780 and
1890, the Five Civilized Tribes had become well versed in politico-
legal battles. The problem presented to the United States by the
two groups of tribes was basically different: the western tribes had
retained their lands by the gun; the Five Civilized Tribes were re-
taining theirs by the law book.
TChe enactments of the 1890-1907 era intended to prepare the
area for statehood took on a different character on opposite sides
of the state. In Oklahoma Territory, the land base was limited
through the allotment and cession agreements, reducing the land
holdings of the tribes to a level manageable by the federal govern-
ment and opening the balance to non-Indian settlement, while
leaving the tribal governmental powers intact. In the Indian Ter-
ritory, restrictions were placed on the internal governing
mechanisms of the tribes, thus reducing their governmental ac-
tivities to a manageable level for the federal government while
leaving the tribal land base intact. Thus, the allotment process of
the Five Civilized Tribes and the tribes of the Quapaw Agency was
very similar in most respects to the allotment process of the Kan-
sas (Kaw) and the Osages. Under the test propounded in
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DeCoteau,' there appears to be no legal reason for the presump-
tion that the acts of the 1890-1907 era extinguished the reservation
boundaries of the Indian Territory tribes.
In the Indian Territory, the Oklahoma Organic Act of 1890'"
expanded the jurisdiction of the United States court created in
1889 to include jurisdiction over crimes and controversies between
members or citizens of different Indian tribes or nations. Section
36 of the Act provided:
That jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the United States
court in the Indian Territory over all controversies arising
between members or citizens of one tribe or nation of Indians
and the members or citizens of other tribes or nations in the
Indian Territory, and any citizen or member of one tribe or
nation who may commit any offense or crime against the per-
son or property of a citizen or member of another tribe or na-
tion shall be subject to the same punishment in the Indian
Territory as he would be if both parties were citizens of the
United States. And any member or citizen of any Indian tribe
or nation in the Indian Territory shall have the right to in-
voke the aid of said court therein for the protection of his
person or property as against any person not a member of the
same tribe or nation as though he were a citizen of the United
States.
This section is analogous to Section 12 of the act opening the
courts of the Territory of Oklahoma to the citizens or members of
the Indian tribes located there. There is no reason to suppose that
Sections 12 and 36 do not have the same effect, namely, making
the federal courts available to litigants of different tribes or na-
tions on a nonmandatory basis very similar to diversity jurisdic-
tion for citizens of different states. Sections 29, 30, and 31 of this
act defined the jurisdiction of the United States court in the Indian
Territory to preserve fully the exclusive tribal jurisdiction over
members of the same tribe or nation.
The Act of June 7, 1897,"° applicable only in the Indian Ter-
ritory, represents a radical shift in congressional mood from
allowing the Indian tribes to retain tribal jurisdiction over Indian
matters toward divestment of tribal jurisdiction. The 1897 Act
states:
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"Provided further", That on and after January first, eigh-
teen hundred and ninety-eight, the United States courts in
said Territory shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
and authority to try and determine all civil cases in law and
equity thereafter instituted and all criminal causes for the
punishment of any offense committed after January first,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, by an person in said Ter-
ritory, and the United States commissioners in said Territory
shall have and exercise the powers and jurisdiction already
conferred upon them by existing laws of the United States as
respects all persons and property in said Territory; and the
laws of the United States and the State of Arkansas in force in
the Territory shall apply to all persons therein, irrespective of
race, said courts exercising jurisdiction thereof as now con-
ferred upon them in the trial of like causes: and any citizen of
any one of said tribes otherwise qualified who can speak and
understand the English language may serve as a juror in any
of said courts.'
This 1897 Act appears to have conferred civil and criminal
jurisdiction on the United States courts in the Indian Territory
over all persons regardless of race, in addition to placing the laws
of Arkansas and the United States in force throughout the Indian
Territory."'
The Act of June 28, 1898,"' applicable only in the Indian Ter-
ritory and commonly referred to as the Curtis Act, continued the
trend set by the 1897 Act and apparently abolished the tribal
courts then existing in the Indian Territory and rendered the ex-
isting tribal laws unenforceable in the United States courts.
That on the first of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, all tribal courts in Indian Territory shall be abolished,
and no officer of said courts shall thereafter have any
authority whatever to do or perform any act theretofore
authorized by any law in connection with said courts, or to
receive any pay for same; and all such civil and criminal
causes pending in any court shall be transferred to the United
States court in said Territory by filing with the clerk of the
court the original papers in the suit: as to the Chickasaw,
Choctaw, and Creek tribes or nations until the first day of
October, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight."'
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And Section 26 of the Curtis Act states: "That on and after the
passage of this Act the laws of the various tribes or nations of In-
dians shall not be enforced at law or in equity by the courts of the
United States in the Indian Territory.""'
A 1909 federal appellate court decision, Hays v. Bassinger,5
held that tribal courts continued to be vested with a limited
jurisdiction, and this decision is supported by a more careful
analysis of specific allotment agreements. For example, the
Seminole allotment agreement, passed on July 1, 1898,16 two days
after the Curtis Act and therefore controlling, states in the portion
of the agreement defining the jurisdictional status of the area:
The United States Courts now existing, or that may hereafter
be created, in Indian Territory shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of all controversies growing out of the title, ownership,
occupation, or use of real estate owned by the Seminoles,
and to try all persons charged with homicide, embezzlement,
bribery, and embracery hereafter committed in the Seminole
country, without reference to race or citizenship of the per-
sons charged with such crime; and any citizen or officer of
said nation charged with any such crime, if convicted, shall
be punished as if he were a citizen or officer of the United
States, and the courts of said nation shall retain all the
jurisdiction which they now have, except as herein trans-
ferred to the courts of the United States.117
And further: "When this agreement is ratified by the Seminole Na-
tion and the United States the same shall serve to repeal all the
provisions of the Act of Congress approved June seventh,
eighteen-ninety seven, in any manner affecting the proceedings of
the general council of the Seminole Nation.".. This single example
illustrates the compelling need for an extensive individualized
research in any attempt to determine specific tribal rights from the
general legislation. From the Allotment Agreement, it appears that
the Seminole Tribal Court of 1898 is still a viable legal entity.
The Act of April 28, 1904,19 further adversely affected the
jurisdiction of tribal governments in the Indian Territory. This
Act in pertinent part states:
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All the laws of Arkansas heretofore put in force in the In-
dian Territory are hereby continued and extended in their
operation, so as to embrace all persons and estates in said
Territory, whether Indian, freedman, or otherwise, and full
and complete jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the
district courts in said Territory in the settlement of all estates
of decedents, the guardianships of minors and incompetents,
whether Indians, freedmen, or otherwise .... 0
The Act of April 26, 1906, "'entitled "An Act to provide for the
final disposition of the affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes in the In-
dian Territory .... " was purportedly designed to liquidate the in-
terests of the Five Civilized Tribes, but Section 28 of the Act seem-
ingly indicates that the result of all the previously discussed enact-
ments serve not to extinguish tribal governments but only to
render unenforceable the existing laws of those tribes or nations
and to vacate certain tribal governmental offices." Section 28 pro-
vides:
That the tribal existence and present tribal governments of
the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole
tribes or nations are hereby continued in full force and effect
for all purposes authorized by law, until otherwise provided
by law, but the tribal council or legislature in any of said
tribes or nations shall not be in session for a longer period
than thirty days in any one year: Provided, That no act, or-
dinance, or resolution (except resolutions of adjournment) of
the tribal council or legislature of any of said tribes or nations
shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the
United States: Provided, further, That no contract involving
the payment or expenditure of any money or affecting any
property belonging to any of said tribes or nations made by
them or by any officer thereof, shall be of any validity until
approved by the President of the United States."
By the 1906 Act, the tribal existence and tribal governments
were continued in full force and effect, provided that (1) the tribal
legislature should not remain in session more than thirty days in
one year, (2) no act, ordinance, or resolution of the tribal
legislature would be valid until approved by the President of the
United States, and (3) no contract affecting tribal land or expen-
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diture of tribal funds would be valid until approved by the Presi-
dent of the United States." It should be noted that these restric-
tions, with approval power resting in the Secretary of the Interior,
apply equally today to almost every Indian tribe in the United
States.
Section 26 of the Curtis Act " declaring the tribal laws unen-
forceable in the federal courts seemingly is referring to the tribal
laws in existence in 1898, and is not applicable to future enact-
ments of the tribal legislature as provided for in the allotment
agreements and the 1906 Act cited above. These laws, rendered
unenforceable in the federal courts also, were not abolished or
repealed. They simply are without a forum for their enforce-
ment. In practical terms, this fact is significant if these tribal
governments are to be restored along traditional lines. While the
existing courts and tribal taxes were abolished, the power and
authority of the tribe to establish and maintain a court and taxes
apparently were not abolished. The effect of this Act is simply to
require presidential approval of any new court or tax structure.
Apparently, the tribal powers of self-government and the judicial
legislative authority of these Indian tribes continued beyond this
series of limiting congressional enactments except where
specifically extinguished by federal law.12
In reviewing the various acts,127 of this period, it is important to
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More recently, the District Court of the District of Columbia ruled in the case of Harjo v.
Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1976), that despite the general intentions of Congress
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ultimately to terminate the tribal
government of the Creek Nation and an elaborate statutory scheme to do so, the termina-
tion was never statutorially accomplished and the government was in fact specifically con-
tinued. The Court went on to hold that the Creek National Legislature of the 1867 constitu-
tion was still the source of power to make appropriations from tribal funds and that any
other method was illegal. The Court stated at page 1143: "As the foregoing discussion
makes clear, under the 1867 constitution and the relevant federal law, the expenditure of
tribal funds which the federal defendants now make and permit to be made under the
authority of the Principal Chief may not be legally made without the assent of a Creek Na-
tional legislature."
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note that the final result contained in the 1906 Act-providing for
federal approval of major tribal political actions (statutes, or-
dinances, or resolutions) and contracts or expenditures of tribal
funds-is presently standard operating procedure for day-to-day
tribal operations throughout the United States.'" However, when
compared to the operating procedure of the Five Civilized Tribes
in 1895, today's standard operating procedure represents an ex-
tremely serious limitation on tribal government. For instance, in
any contemporary discussion of tribal sovereignty and powers of
self-government, the Navajo Nation is normally cited as the stan-
dard of an Indian tribe possessing full tribal powers to which par-
ticular tribal circumstances can be compared for validation.'29 The
legislative enactments and the contracts for expenditures of the
Navajo Nation involving tribal lands or funds must be approved
by the Secretary of the Interior or such actions have no validity.'30
The tribal governments of the Five Civilized Tribes exercised
unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction over all persons and prop-
erty within their tribal domains and they generally administered
their affairs without federal approval as a requisite for valid ac-
tion. They occupied the position as the standard for comparison
of full tribal powers as fully in the nineteenth century as the Nava-
jo Nation does in the twentieth century, with the exception that
tribal actions were not "subject to approval of the Secretary of the
Interior." Therefore, it is important that the present premises
about tribal government, as compared to the actual exercise of
tribal powers by the Five Civilized Tribes prior to Oklahoma
statehood, should be taken into account in reaching conclusions
about tribal powers that survived the congressional limitation im-
posed upon these tribes. In other words, the tribal powers exercis-
ed by the Five Civilized Tribes were apparently more extensive
than what are, at present, generally recognized as full tribal
powers exercised by the Indian tribes throughout the United
States. It is quite possible that, other than those statutes specifical-
ly extinguishing tribal powers, such as the limit of thirty days as a
yearly legislative session, the net effect of previously cited con-
gressional acts was to reduce the tribal governments of the Five
Civilized Tribes from a loftier status more akin to that of an
enclave at international law, such as the Vatican City or Luxem-
bourg, to that of a present-day Indian tribe.
It has been generally assumed that the tribal governments of the
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Indian tribes in the Indian Territory were dissolved. From this
survey, it is apparent that these tribal governments have tribal
powers more substantial than previously assumed. The deter-
mination of the exact scope of these powers will, of course, de-
pend upon a more precise study of the special acts and pro-
nouncements regarding each particular tribe than can be ac-
complished in this survey.
The Oklahoma Enabling Act provided the statutory mechanism
for the admission of Oklahoma as a state. 3' Through this Act, the
inhabitants of the Territory of Oklahoma and the Indian Territory
were authorized to adopt a constitution and become the state of
Oklahoma, provided, "that nothing contained in the said constitu-
tion shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of persons or
property pertaining to the Indians of said Territories (so long as
such rights shall remain unextinguished) or to limit or affect the
authority of the Government of the United States to make any law
or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, property or
other rights by treaties, agreement, law or otherwise, which it
would have been competent to make if this Act had never been
passed." 32
The proposed constitution was required to contain a disclaimer
clause."3 The disclaimer clause provides:
That the people inhabiting the State do agree and declare
that they forever disclaim all right and title in or to any unap-
propriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof,
and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any
Indian, tribe, or nation; and that until the title to any such
public land shall have been extinguished by the United States
the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction,
disposal and control of the United States .... 1'
The disclaimer clause, as part of the constitution, was adopted
by the people of Oklahoma in an irrevocable ordinance accepting
the terms and conditions of the Enabling Act on April 22, 1907.
This disclaimer clause has not been amended or repealed.
Summary
The close of the 1890-1907 era ended the era of special legisla-
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tion which cast the distinction between Oklahoma Territory and
Indian Territory. Any special legislation regarding the tribes in
either Oklahoma Territory or Indian Territory after this date
reflects only insignificant modifications of the legal patterns
previously set out, or relates specifically to the many facets of in-
dividual land tenure occasioned by the allotment process affecting
each major grouping of tribes. The next major legislative enact-
ments bearing upon tribal government in Oklahoma did not take
place until 1934 and 1936 with the passage of the Indian version of
the Roosevelt administration's New Deal, the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1934, and its Oklahoma supplement in 1936, the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.
As a result of the special legislation of this era, it was assumed
that the tribes were winding down and would shortly go out of
business. Research into the rights and powers of the tribes
stopped, and tribal governments became less and less important as
the Bureau of Indian Affairs began to usurp and dominate the
legitimate functions of the tribal governments or to veto their ex-
ercise. The research for this survey indicates that this assumption
was wrong and that, as a general rule, the powers of the tribal
governments in the state of Oklahoma survived the allotment era
to the extent that these powers survived in Indian tribes generally.
The idea that the Indian tribes in Oklahoma are somehow ab-
normal yields to closer analysis. Extensive research is necessary on
a tribe-by-tribe basis to determine the exact legal status and
powers of the tribes in the Indian Territory.
C. 1907-1934- The Quiet Aftermath
The period subsequent to Oklahoma statehood was a time of in-
activity for tribal governments. The Curtis Act and severe con-
straints imposed by agency fiat had curtailed the freedom of ac-
tion formerly enjoyed by the tribal governing bodies. The tribal
court system, where it had existed, was replaced with secretarial
Courts of Indian Offenses, and in time, even these ceased to
operate. The tribal police were supplanted by the non-Indian
agency forces.
The cases considered by the courts consisted almost exclusively
of actions to define the rights of individual Indians. Mineral leases
and probate of Indian estates dominated the court dockets. Litiga-
tion to define tribal rights was almost nonexistent.
The Supreme Court did, however, render a decision in a
criminal case which established a fundamental concept necessary
to tribal jurisdiction in the state of Oklahoma. In United States v.
Ramsey,' the Court found that Indian country did exist in Osage
County on those lands allotted within the reservation. The Court
considered the issue of whether allotments made by restricted fee
patents and allotments made by trust patent were jurisdictionally
distinguishable and found the distinction unpersuasive. The Court
found that the wording of the congressional act'36 established that
all allotted Indian lands irrespective of allotment in trust or in fee
should be considered as Indian country so long as the United
States possessed a supervisory interest.
Although there were territorial areas which could be delineated
as InL'1n country within Oklahoma, the exercise of tribal authori-
ty wittin such areas was largely nonexistent. The extremely
limited powers of tribal governments which were assumed to exist
during this period were most closely akin to those that might be
exercised by a nonprofit corporation. The analogous privileges
that a tribe and a nonprofit corporation might possess would in-
clude tax exemption for the organization and its income, and the
ability to hold tax-exempt land.'3
*The period subsequent to statehood was a period of dormancy.
There was no particular effort on the part of Congress to make
further depredations in the area of tribal sovereignty. With the ex-
ception of the Bureau of Indian Affiars, the tribes were largely ig-
nored by the federal and state governments.
D. 1934-1953- The Revitalization of Tribal Government
The decade of the 1930's was marked by two significant con-
gressional acts which dramatically altered the treatment accorded
Indian tribes.'"
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) was specifically designed
to reverse the trend established by the enunciated purpose of the
allotment acts. The allotment policy had been promulgated with
the purpose of breaking up tribal assets into individual holdings,
disestablishing traditional tribal governments, and suppressing In-
dian customs and laws. The IRA was established as a countervail-
ing force to the assimilationist policy of the allotment acts and, as
well, by the combination of its provisions, a means of providing
reinforcement for tribal government. The provisions of the IRA
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provided protection for the then existing land base and for expan-
sion of that land base through purchase of additional acreage. The
tribal organization was to be further reinforced by economic pro-
grams which would provide federal loans and the capability of
business incorporation. The Act also provided for the infusion of
Indians into the white-dominated regulatory agencies."'
The Act positively reaffirmed the tribal governments by pro-
viding for the adoption of constitutions and bylaws for unorgan-
ized tribes by which the tribes could revitalize their tribal govern-
ments. Section 16 recognized the power to organize as an inherent
right and later recognized the powers of inherent sovereignty
possessed by the tribes in the absence of explicit withdrawal of
particular powers by congressional act or treaty by stating: "Sec.
16. Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation,
shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may
adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall
become effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult
members of the tribe.. . . ""'° This section of the Act recognized the
power of the tribe to obtain nonagency counsel and to establish
the fees (subject to secretarial approval) to be paid for those ser-
vices. Section 16 further recognized the viability of tribal govern-
ment by providing that such tribal organizations were empowered
to negotiate with federal, state, and local officials and to veto any
proposed sale of trust lands held for the tribe. The tribe was also
made a party to the secretarial appropriations procedure by a re-
quirement that the tribe be informed of all proposed budget re-
quirements affecting the tribe."'
Another provision of the Act provided the tribes adopting con-
stitutions with the means of establishing a tribal corporate entity.
By plebescite, subsequent a requested secretarial charter, the tribe
could achieve corporate power to operate a business, acquire,
hold or dispose of property, and to have such powers as may be
necessary for a lawful business venture.' 2
By the terms of the Act, twenty-eight designated tribes of
Oklahoma were precluded from participation in some of the pro-
grams.' 3 The extension of the trust periods, restrictions on transfer
of Indian lands and purchase of new lands were made inap-
plicable. Also withheld from the Oklahoma tribes were the provi-
sions pertaining to tribal constitutions and corporate charters. The
139. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 12, 48 Stat. 984, 986 (1934).
140. Id., § 16, 48 Stat. at 987.
141. Id.
142. Id. at § 17.143. Id., 48 Stat. at 986 § 13.
Oklahoma tribes were excluded from the provisions of the Act at
the request of Senator Elmer Thomas. The Senator's rationale for
this request centered on a mistaken assumption that because no
reservations existed in Oklahoma the language of the Act would
have required the tribes to resume reservation status before the
provisions could be applicable.
The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (OIWA)," extended the
provisions of the IRA to the Oklahoma tribes and provided for
some significant additional features. In addition to the provisions
of the IRA, the OIWA provided for the formation of local Indian
cooperatives for credit administration, production marketing,
consumer protection, and land management. Embodied in the Act
were the IRA provisions for constitutions and charters for cor-
porate activity. The provisions for acquisition of land for
Oklahoma Indians were also included. Although other provisions
of the IRA were not specifically included, the ninth section of the
OIWA explicitly repeals all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with
the OIWA. Therefore, those sections of the IRA precluded from
application by Section 13 of the IRA would, subsequent to the
OIWA, be applicable to Oklahoma tribes."5 Such a reading of Sec-
tion 9 of the OIWA would, in fact, give Oklahoma Indians all the
benefits accruing under the IRA in addition to those enumerated in
the OIWA.
The combined force of these two acts provided a potent tool for
the assertion of tribal governmental powers. Heretofore, it has
been a common assumption that because of Section 13 the IRA
had no relevance for the tribes of Oklahoma. This assumption is
clearly erroneous. Although specific paragraphs were excluded
from application to Oklahoma tribes in the Indian Reorganization
Act, the balance of the Act, including Indian preference for federal
employment, did apply as of the time it became law.
The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act followed the IRA and ex-
tended each of the features from which the Oklahoma tribes had
been excluded. Two sections within the body of the Act specifical-
ly addressed the excluded provisions. Chartered Oklahoma tribes
may "enjoy any other rights or privileges secured to an organized
Indian tribe under the Act of June 18, 1934 [IRA] .... ""' These
provisions were thereby incorporated into the OIWA and were
secured to the Indian tribes of Oklahoma. The Act expressly
repealed the provisions of other acts which are inconsistent with
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the provisions of the OIWA.' 7 The OIWA by its charter provi-
sions provided an optional form of government for the tribes. The
land acquisition feature of the Act provided a source of income for
the tribal government. Operating in the alternate form, the tribe
can exercise "any powers which may properly be vested in a body
corporate under the laws of the State of Oklahoma.... ""'
By its operation, the OIWA is superior to the IRA because
under the OIWA, the tribes have both the basic provisions of the
IRA and the added features of the OIWA.' 9 Regardless of the
benefits which might accrue to a tribe organized under these acts,
very little actual usage has been made of the more potent provi-
sions. In western Oklahoma all tribes except the Otoe-Missouria
are organized under OIWA constitutions. However, only a small
number of these tribes have taken the next step and obtained a
corporate charter. Even those who have charters have not
established a full selection of IRA powers. Those without an
IRA/OIWA formula constitution have unnecessarily limited tribal
powers and inhibited tribal growth potential.
One particularly interesting feature of the OIWA was the provi-
sion for incorporation by reference of the IRA rights and
privileges and the implications of that provision for the reassertion
of tribal governmental powers." If Congress had extinguished one
of the inherent attributes of tribal sovereignty and then, by a later
act, conferred on the tribes the power to create the extinguished
inherent attribute by statute, the tribe could use these derived
powers as a source to replace the lost inherent power."'
The IRA/OIWA also introduced the interesting concept of
organizing an Indian tribe as a corporate body.' 2 The corporate
powers of the tribe are analogous to those exercised by a
municipal corporation. As such, a tribal corporation has the
power to establish ordinances for the regulation of the in-
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corporated area; the power to provide services for the populace to
include police and a court system; the power to tax; to obligate the
corporate body; and to contract for procurement of goods, ser-
vices, and facilities."' While this municipal analogy may be seen as
generally valid, it fails with respect to one particular point. The
entire scope of the power of a municipality is based on a delega-
tion of power from the state sovereign. On the other hand, the
power of an Indian tribe to govern is inherent and exists because
of the historical sovereignty of the tribe, which predates both the
Constitution and the formation of the states. The powers of the
tribe are restricted only by the limitations imposed by Congress on
the exercise of these powers.
Tribes have shown little indication of an effective exercise of
these confirmed powers. In a historical perspective, the American
Indian tribes were almost uniformly subjected to extreme political
and cultural pressure."M The impact of this pressure on the tribal
organizations in Oklahoma was extreme. In effect, the tribes
withdrew from an active exercise of tribal powers and allowed the
BIA to perform their governmental functions."n
After the passage of the OIWA, the next significant act related
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to disposition of allotted lands of Indians dying intestate and
without heirs.'" Congress provided that all such lands which had
been originally allotted from a reservation would escheat to the
tribe of the holder or to its successor. This Act may be viewed as a
confirmation by Congress of the sovereignty of the tribes because,
by the Anglo-American common law, land can only escheat to a
sovereign, and provisions of the Act specifically provide for
escheat to the tribal entity. The Act may also be seen as a recogni-
tion by Congress of the continuing viability of the tribal organiza-
tion and as an endorsement of the tribal governmental function
and position in the governmental heirarchy. Subsequent sections
of the Act further provided that if the allotment of such Indian
was from the public domain, such land would escheat to the
United States, and that the Act was not applicable to the Five
Civilized Tribes."7
The period produced two significant cases which purportedly
defined the existence of Indian country within the state of
Oklahoma. In Ex parte Nowabbi, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals was asked to determine if the state had jurisdic-
tion to prosecute an Indian who had killed another Indian on
allotted lands of the Choctaw Nation. The court considered that
the case turned on the determination of whether Indian country
existed in Oklahoma and if, in fact, the allotted lands constituted
such country. The court considered the rationale of Ramsey, 9 but
distinguished this case based on a proviso to the 1906 amendment
to the General Allotment Act."w The verbiage of the amendment
had reserved exclusive jurisdiction over allotment lands to the
United States, but the proviso had excluded those lands formerly
within Indian Territory. Thus, the court decided that the proviso
was intended to exclude the allottees in the Indian Territory from
the federal jurisdiction which the amendment was designed to con-
firm. In this analysis the court was clearly wrong. The Choctaw
allotment on which the crime in question had been committed was
established by the workings of the Curtis Act,'6' as were all other
allotments within the former Indian Territory. The General Allot-
ment Act'62 had no relevance for these particular lands and certain-
ly an amendment to that Act was immaterial to the question at
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hand. If the court had followed the provisions of the controlling
Curtis Act, it would have found that the United States retained
jurisdiction over allotment land excepting only those specific areas
where a delegation had been made to the state by an act of Con-
gress."
The second case which addressed the question of the existence
of Indian country was Tooisgah v. United States.' The facts of
the case indicate that Tooisgah was an Indian convicted of killing
another Indian on a Kiowa, Comanche, Apache allotment. The
conviction was appealed to the Tenth Circuit on the issue of the
propriety of state jurisdiction over the criminal indictment. The
court found that state jurisdiction was proper, but only because of
the peculiar circumstances of the case. The offense was committed
in 1941 under the laws defining Indian country at that time" and
providing federal jurisdiction over the crime of murder.1" In 1941,
the offense must have been committed "on or within an Indian
reservation" to establish federal jurisdiction. The definition of In-
dian country was completely revised in 1948 and allotments were
specifically added to those areas defined as Indian country.67
Judge Murrah, writing the opinion of the court, recognized in par-
ticular this difficulty and acknowledged that if the case had been
decided under the later law the court would have found the allot-
ment to be "Indian country" and, therefore, within federal
jurisdiction.'"
The problem presented by these cases is the progeny which they
have sired. Due to badly referenced headnotes later cited by the
courts, Tooisgah, in actuality a reservation disestablishment case,
has been taken to mean something entirely different from what
Judge Murrah stated. He wrote:
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the trust
allotments in question might have been construed as "Indian
Country" under 217 or 548 when the offense was committed,
since we are convinced that Congress did not intend to use
the terms "Indian Country" and "within the limits of
any.., reservation" synonymously when it came to relax the
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limitations imposed upon 217 by 218. When the legislative
scheme is considered in its historical setting, we think it of
controlling significance that instead of employing the
familiar term "Indian Country", with its broad and flexible
definition to delineate federal jurisdiction, Congress chose
language carefully designed to recognize the sovereign
jurisdiction of a state, unless the offense was committed on a
place set apart for the government of the Indians as a tribe.
The deliberate choice of the phrase "within any Indian reser-
vation under the jurisdiction of the United States Govern-
ment" indicates, we think, a Congressional disposition to
restrict federal jurisdiction to organized reservations lying
within a state.
In the reenactment of 548 as Section 1153, Title 18
U.S.C.A., Congress substituted "Indian Country" for "on
[or] within any Indian reservation", thus conferring federal
jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes when committed in
Indian Country, as defined in Section 1151 of the Revised
Criminal Code.
But judging federal jurisdiction here under the words of the
statute when the offense was committed, we are now con-
strained to hold that when the reservation was dissolved and
tribal government broken up, the allotted lands lost their
character as lands "within any Indian reservation. "Nor did
they retain or acquire a character and identity peculiar to a
separate Indian reservation. We therefore hold that the court
lacked jurisdiction over the offense. The order is accordingly
reversed and the cause remanded with directions to vacate
the judgment and dismiss the indictment.'"
Both Tooisgah and Nowabbi are essentially legal fossils, relics of
a past state of the law with no continuing application today.'70
The period beginning in 1934 was characterized by the govern-
mental formulation of policies designed to enhance the exercise of
tribal sovereignty. These policies sought a revitalization of tribal
government and a reinvestiture of the tribes with governmental
functions. This "New Deal" for the Indian tribes was in effect an
externally imposed renaissance for tribal organization. The tribes
were initially reticent with respect to the reconstructive, or, in
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some instances, novel provisions of the tribal reorganization acts.
The provisions of these acts did, however, encourage the exercise
of tribal powers and the assumption of responsibility for tribal
progress and prosperity.
E. 1953-Present- Termination to Self-Determination
In the year 1953, a radical change occurred in the congressional
policy concerning Indian tribes. The policy change was achieved
through the efforts of a small but very active group in Congress
who denied the traditional policy of Congress in preserving the
legal identity of the Indian tribes. The group advocated in its stead
a policy of assimilation of Indians into the dominant culture and
termination of the legal status of the tribes.
The initial manifestation of the assimilationists' policy was in
the form of a House Resolution."' The resolution established a
goal of dissolving tribal governments and the federal-Indian rela-
tionship thereby rendering Indians subject to the same laws as
other citizens. The resolution targeted four states for elimination
of tribal organizations and five individual tribes in other states for
termination. It further required the Secretary of the Interior to
make proposals for laws necessary to accomplish this end.
By the provisions of the first termination act, the Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin ceased to exist as a federally recognized
entity."' The Act established that all property of the tribe would
be turned over to a corporation established for the purpose of
managing those assets. All services furnished to the tribe by
federal agencies were ended. The rolls were to be closed and
members of the tribe were precluded in participation in federal In-
dian services. The Act removed the members of the tribe from the
protection of federal Indian statutes and made the tribal members
subject to "the laws of the several states."'"
Four Oklahoma tribes were subjected to termination under bills
passed into law in 1956 and 1957. Under these bills, the Wyan-
dotte," the Peoria," the Ottawa," and the Modoc"' were ter-
minated from federal recognition. Each of these tribes was re-
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moved from federal recognition under provisions almost identical
to those of the Menominee. In each instance, the tribes were sum-
marily removed from the protection of federal statutes and the
laws of the state were made applicable to both the tribe and its
members. The acts relegated these Oklahoma tribal organizations
to operation as associations under state law and denied the tribe
access to the services that had formerly been furnished by the
Quapaw subagency. The tribes were left without means of exercis-
ing inherent powers and without official governmental bodies for
administration of tribal affairs.
The termination policy as enumerated in House Concurrent
Resolution 108 had tragic consequences for the affected tribes. In
1975 the American Indian Policy Review Commission appointed a
Task Force on Terminated and Nonfederally Recognized Indians
to study the effect of termination. The Task Force concluded:
The Task Force has determined that the termination acts
were passed by Congress under very uncommon and ques-
tionable circumstances. The legislation was acted upon in
haste, with little debate, as the handwork of a small number
of legislators employing tactics which would not be
duplicated today. The Task Force must conclude that the
legislation was not given the proper consideration and
reflected the efforts of legislators intent on the passage of the
legislation at a time when it appeared that nothing else was
working to "solve the Indian problem" and at a time when
the Bureau of Indian Affairs appeared at its worst. The Task
Force concludes that termination was another experiment,
however ill conceived and destructive, with no controls and
no provisions for reversal.
Termination was not initiated by the Indians, was not ade-
quately understood by them and was, for the most part, not
consented to by them .... The Task Force can only conclude
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Congress made the selec-
tions for the participants in the experiment.
The years since termination show that is has not had a
positive effect on the lives of the Indians and has indeed made
life more difficult for them. Termination has resulted in the
loss of tribal lands and the disintegration of tribal society,
has weakened tribal organization and placed cultural identity
in jeopardy, has left those most in need, the young, the old,
the sick without adequate programs to help them, has
eliminated special federal services and rights as Indians and
has resulted in exploitation of tribal members .... The
Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior has
in some cases, seriously mismanaged the trust assets of the
members of tribes undergoing termination. The Executive
Branch has, in some cases, failed to follow the substantive
and procedural dictates of termination acts ....
Termination was a bad experiment, one which should not
be repeated and one which should be rectified. In every in-
stance where the point was raised, there has been over-
whelming Indian response against termination and in favor
of restoration of tribes.
The courts have repeatedly held that Congress has plenary
power over Indian affairs; however, with that power must
also come responsibility. The Congress and the Executive
Branch of the United States Government has played with the
lives of the Indian people through the termination experiment
and such experiment has been a failure.178
In the recommendation portion of the report, the Task Force
proposed numerous policy revisions for immediate implementa-
tion to offset the effect of the termination policy on Indian tribes
and for ultimate reversal of the policy by means of a restoration
act.
The reversal of the termination trend reached full force in 1973
with the restoration of the Menominee Tribe to federal recogni-
tion.17 The Act restored "all rights and privileges of the tribe
which may have been diminished or lost" under the Termination
Act of 1954." The Act called for the election of a Menominee
Restoration Committee to supervise the implementation of the
Act. Among the committee's responsibilities was the conduct of an
election of the general tribal membership for the purpose of ap-
proving a constitution and bylaws as provided for in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934. The committee was also charged with
the responsibility for the conduct of a general election for the pur-
pose of electing the tribal officials. The enactment of the
Menominee Restoration Act constituted an acknowledgment by
Congress of the fallacy of the termination theory. This Act has
been followed by additional legislation designed to accomplish
restoration for other tribes disestablished during the era of
political expediency in the 1950's.
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The second major assimilationist program was the extension of
state, criminal, and civil jurisdiction to the Indian country.'1 The
law provided for immediate assumption of jurisdiction by five
states and a sixth was added by subsequent amendment.' 2 The Act
also provided for optional Public Law 280 jurisdiction in other
states to be effected by enactment of necessary constitutional
amendments (to revoke disclaimer clauses) and statutory
authorization for jurisdiction.
The Act contained serious flaws from its inception. There was
no provision in it for any delegation to the states of the power to
tax the Indian trust lands. The states were therefore left without a
tax base to pay for the expenses of the assumed jurisdiction. The
tribal sovereignty and ability to exercise inherent governmental
powers was subordinated to state jurisdiction without provisions
even for formal consultation, much less approval by the affected
tribes. Last, there was no provision for retrocession of jurisdiction
to the United States, if the arrangement proved unworkable once
the state assumed jurisdiction. However, Congress provided for
retrocession of jurisdiction in 1968,' and a federal court in United
States v. Brown'" held that the Secretary of the Interior could
validly accept a retrocession jurisdiction. In actuality this often
proved to be the case as states found that the exercise of the new-
found power was expensive and often caused a severe strain on
already overtaxed local enforcement agencies.
In spite of the discussed shortcomings of the Act, it was viewed
by the assimilationists as further means of demeaning the tribal
authority through disassociation of the federal government from
Indian affairs. In retrospect, this Act, too, was conceived and ex-
ecuted in haste without proper cognizance for the responsibilities
of Congress to the Indian peoples.'"
Oklahoma, as with the balance of the states of the Union, was
included as one of these states which could assume jurisdiction as
an optional state by the constitutional amendment/statutory
enactment process. Johnston Murray, who was governor of the
state at the time of the inception of Public Law 280, was contacted
by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior and queried concerning
the possibility of Oklahoma assuming jurisdiction. In a letter, Mr.
Murray responded to the effect that since Indian country had been
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abolished in Oklahoma and the tribal governments dissolved (an
erroneous assumption), all Oklahoma citizens were subject to the
same laws and there was no need for Oklahoma to assume Public
Law 280 jurisdiction." No further action was ever taken to assert
Public Law 280 jurisdiction in Oklahoma.""
A significant alteration in the legal relationship of the individual
to the tribe and between the tribe and federal government oc-
curred with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Title II of
that Act is commonly referred to as the Indian Bill of Rights. In-
dians were guaranteed certain rights similar to those protected by
the first ten amendments of the United States Constitution in their
relationship to the tribe.'
Significant variations from the Bill of Rights are found in certain
subsections of the Civil Rights Act. While guaranteeing freedom
of religion, the Act does not prevent a tribe from establishing a
tribal religion or even being governed by a tribal religious body.'89
An accused may retain counsel to assist with defense efforts, but if
the individual so chooses, he must bear the expense." The punish-
ment that may be imposed by the tribe is limited to six months in
jail and/or a $500 fine.' 9 The right to jury trial is guaranteed, but
with the added proviso that juries may consist of six or more per-
sons. ' The Act further provides a right of habeas corpus hearing
in federal court for any person detained by an Indian tribe to test
the validity of that detention.'
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to draft a model code to
govern courts of Indian offenses. That code must assure that the
individual charged before such court is provided with the same
rights, privileges, and immunities as would be available before a
federal court. The title further provides that the code must insure
186. See Letters from Oklahoma Governor Johnston Murray to Assistant Secretary ot
the Interior Orme Lewis (1953), discussed in text at notes 48-49, supra.
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assembly; freedom from unreasonable search and seizure and from warrant except upon
probable cause; no double jeopardy; no self-incrimination; no seizure of private property
without compensation; speedy trial is guaranteed, as are the rights to be informed of ac-
cusations and compulsory process; freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and ex-
cessive bail; equal protection and due process under the law; and ex post Facto laws and
bills of attainder are prohibited.
189. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1970).
190. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1970).
191. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1970).
192. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1970).
193. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284 § 203, 82 Stat. 78, 25 U.S.C. § 1303
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that an accused is informed of his rights under the United States
Constitution. The directive concludes with the provisions that the
code will establish proper qualifications for judges of the court of
Indian offenses and provide for the establishing of educational
classes for training of these judges.""
The Act significantly revised Public Law 280 and rectified most
of: the serious complaints registered against it. The Act now pro-
vides for retrocession by the state when the exercise of jurisdiction
under Public Law 280 is found to be impractical.'' A special elec-
tion must be held for the members of an affected tribe to vote via a
referendum to determine if assumption of jurisdiction by the state
is acceptable to the Indian people."'
The provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act announced a marked
change in congressional attitude toward the Indian people and
their tribal organizations and a restoration of the traditional role
of Congress as guardian and protector of the Indians. Implicit in
this Act is a recognition of the continued viability of tribal govern-
mental functions and the exercise of inherent tribal powers. Im-
plied also in this Act is the imposition of limited restrictions on
these inherent powers within the context of Anglo-American com-
mon law."
In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination Act.''
By the terms of that Act the Indian tribes can contract with the
federal government to assume responsibility for services normally
performed for the tribe by the Departments of the Interior or
Health, Education and Welfare.'" The Act provides that the
departments may, under specified circumstances, refuse to ap-
prove contract offers. When such offers are rejected, the tribe
must be notified in writing within sixty days of the objection and
the department must, to the extent practicable, assist the tribe in
overcoming the objection.2" The departments must hold hearings
on proposed regulations which will affect services to Indians and
provide for an appellate procedure for reconsideration of rejected
contract offers. The Act further provides for grants to Indian
tribes for improvement of tribal government, improvement of the
capacity of the tribal government to participate in contract ac-
194. Id., 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (1970).
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tivities under the Act, and for purchase of land necessary for
either of these purposes." '
The Indian Self-Determination Act was designed to facilitate
participation by the tribes in providing services required for the
functioning of the tribe. Participation in the municipal-type ser-
vices needed by the tribe provides experience for the tribal
organization as a functioning government. The tribal government
is thereby strengthened and given practical experience in the exer-
cise of powers inherent in the tribe.
Two cases were decided in the period after 1953 which
significantly affected the exercise of tribal powers. In DeCotea 202
the Supreme Court considered the question of the existence of In-
dian country within the former boundaries of a reservation. The
Court found that Indian country exists in a checkerboard fashion
on those areas of land which were allotted to Indians and which
are still held in trust for them by the United States government.
The Court found that this Indian country was still subject to
federal and tribal jurisdiction to the exclusion of the state govern-
ment. The Court stated: "It is common ground here that Indian
conduct occurring on the trust allotments is beyond the state's
jurisdiction, being instead the proper concern of tribal or federal
authorities."2 3 The Court, however, also found that the ceded land
within the former boundaries of terminated reservations did not
constitute Indian country and that the state had properly asserted
jurisdiction in those areas.'
In the case of Harjo v. Kleppe, the District Court of the
District of Columbia considered whether the Creek constitutional
provisions for the appropriation of tribal funds survived the
operation of the Curtis and Five Civilized Tribes acts. The Creek
Nation, under an 1867 constitution, had established a National
Council and had invested that council with, among other duties,
the responsibility for expenditure of tribal funds. The Creek
legislature was rendered ineffective by acts and policies of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs but was never expressly terminated, nor
was the Creek Nation constitution nullified by Congress. The
main point of contention of the case was the release by the
Secretary of the Interior of tribal funds to the Principal Chief of
the tribe and the Principal Chief's authority to expend those funds
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without authorization by the Creek legislature. The plaintiffs in
the action were duly qualified electors of the Creek Nation and
Allen Harjo was an elected representative of Fish Pond Tribal
Town. These individuals sought to force the Principal Chief to act
in accordance with the 1867 constitution. The court held that the
Creek constitution was in effect and was the proper source of the
authority for the tribal government notwithstanding many years
of bureaucratic suppression of the tribal legislature by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. The court upheld the right of the National
Council to direct and control the expenditure of these funds.
This case upheld the current exercise of tribal powers by a con-
stitutionally mandated tribal government of one of the Five
Civilized Tribes. The ancient tribal constitutions are therefore a
sufficient and proper document for the present delineation of the
governmental roles and the present exercise by the Five Civilized
Tribes of inherent tribal powers.
The period defined in this subsection was an era of convulsive
change in the federal Indian policy. The 1950's were the nadir of
the Indian policy. The powers inherent in the tribes were com-
pletely ignored and the exercise of congressional and bureaucratic
power resembled most closely a totalitarian regime. By the end of
the period, there had been a complete shift in policy. The begin-
ning of the decade of the 1970's found the tenor of both the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches completely reversed. The shift in
the 1970's to legislation supportive of tribal autonomy was as
much a positive factor as the termination policy had been a
negative one. The change greatly enhanced the ability of the tribes
to independently exercise tribal powers and provided the tribes
with wider areas of responsibility and administrative competence.
Conclusion
The Indian's right of self-government is a right which has been
consistently protected by the courts, frequently recognized and in-
termittently ignored by treaty-makers and legislators, and very
widely disregarded by administrative officials. That such rights
have been disregarded is perhaps due more to lack of acquaintance
with the law of the subject than to any drive for increased power
on the part of administrative officials."°
The most basic principle of Indian law, the principle that Indian
tribes retain all governing authority which has not been expressly
206. COHEN, supra note 1, at 122.
limited by Congress," is perhaps the principle which has been
most widely disregarded by administrative officials in their rela-
tionship with the Indian tribes in Oklahoma. Administrative of-
ficials, operating in a constitutional and administrative system
which depends upon delegated power for its very existence, are
understandably uneasy with the concept that tribal governments
can exercise government functions in the absence of express con-
gressional recognition or delegation of the power to exercise those
functions." Yet, from before the existence of the United States as a
Republic, the Indian tribes have been recognized as "distinct, in-
dependent, political communities,"' qualified to exercise govern-
mental functions by reason of their inherent sovereign powers, not
by virtue of a delegation of authority from the United States." '
The creation of a United States government which claimed a
right of ultimate title to the soil occupied by the Indian tribes
simply resulted in the creation of a competitor for the inherent
authority then exercised by the Indian tribes."' As the United
States grew in stature, the treaties and statutes of Congress
became the sources of limitation on the original tribal powers, yet
those powers not so limited remained within the domain of the
tribes."'1 This was the exact situation which existed within what
was to become the state of Oklahoma prior to 1890. The Indian
tribes within the area and the United States federal government
were the only competitors for governmental authority, and the In-
dian tribes generally exercised all the powers of a sovereign except
as expressly limited by treaty or act of Congress.
The period encompassing the years 1890 to 1907 represent the
creation by the Congress of another entity, the state of Oklahoma,
designed to exert governing authority within the same general
area. This entity became a third competitor for governing authori-
ty. Thus, the scope of the tribal right to self-government can be
defined by describing the allocation of governing authority
between the tribal, federal, and state governments. During this
era, a profusion of statutes were enacted which were designed to
grant authority to the new state and to limit the application of the
authority of the tribes. This period, then, is the most legally
significant period in the allocation of the governmental
prerogatives between these three levels of government. In the
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years following this era, Indian tribes in Oklahoma were generally
subjected only to those additional limitations imposed upon all In-
dian tribes throughout the United States.
The confusion which resulted from this profusion of statutes
paving the way for Oklahoma statehood had disastrous conse-
quences for the exercise of governing authority by the tribal
governments. The state of Oklahoma and the federal agencies
charged with protecting Indian interests within the state began to
operate on assumptions which had severe legal consequences on
the Indian tribes' right to self-government. 3 In effect, ad-
ministrative interpretation, rather than judicial construction
became the force behind the decisions affecting the allocation of
governing authority. Indian tribes attempting to exercise their
rightful prerogatives soon learned the importance of ad-
ministrative interpretation by the application to those tribes of the
administrative "golden rule," or in other words, "we got the
gold-we make the rules.... The case against Indian tribal govern-
ments in Oklahoma has been so overstated that tribal prerogatives
sustainable in law are ignored as a matter of policy. Slogans about
"Oklahoma Indians" and "Oklahoma tribal governments" have
created an attitude sustained by inertia that hinders and frustrates
due recognition of tribal governing powers." '
An illustration of the situation described is readily found in con-
sidering the long overdue recognition of tribal law and order
powers. From this survey, it can be affirmatively shown that
Indian country criminal jurisdiction exists in Oklahoma."6
DeCoteau affirmed the position that an Indian tribe's jurisdic-
tional powers are not dependent upon reservation status."' One of
the supposed impediments to tribal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, the
Tooisgah case, is not reflective of the present-day law."' Tribal
2:13. Examples of such assumptions include: "There are no reservations in Oklahoma
[and therefore no viable tribal governments]"; "The Indian tribes were dissolved at
statehood"; "allotments in severalty and the granting of citizenship eliminated the tribal
status."
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jurisdiction over its members was expressly confirmed and re-
served to the tribes by the Oklahoma Organic Act of 189021 and
the Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1906.'m The supposition that the
state of Oklahoma assumed jurisdiction over Indian country
without complying with the statutory requirements of Public Law
280" and without amending the state constitution has been shown
to be clearly erroneous.' With the exception of DeCoteae and
Littlechief,=' the legal situation has been unfolding for a significant
period of time. Yet, in 1975, a federal agency concluded:
Under this statute, [18 U.S.C. § 11521 any offense against
general laws of the United States committed within Indian
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23, 1979. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321,.1322, 1326 (19-970). The procedure outlined in these
statutes must be explicitly followed for the state to acquire jurisdiction. Kennerly v. District
Ct., supra. This 1968 amendment to Pub. L. 83-280 (1953), requiring tribal consent to the
application of state law within the Indian country was enacted to assure that the state
assumption of jurisdiction was undertaken with the consent of those to be governed
thereby: "Fifteen years ago, the Congress gave to the States authority to extend their
criminal and civil jurisdictions to include Indian reservations-where jurisdiction previous-
ly was in the hands of the Indians themselves.
"Fairness and basic democratic principles require that Indians on the affected lands have
a voice in deciding whether a state will assume legal jurisdiction on their land." Message of
President Johnson, 114 CONG. REC. 5520 (1968).
"Perhaps the most significant change to be accomplished by this legislation would be to
amend Public Law 280, which for 15 years has hung like the sword of Damocles over Indian
tribes who have had no voice in the acquisition by States of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over them. Although this power has been exercised infrequently, its very existence has been
a symbol to the reservation Indians that assertions of Federal power profoundly affecting
their daily lives might be made through decisions over which they would have no control,
and in the making of which they might not even be invited to participate.
"Not only would title IV of the pending legislation assure the tribes of a voice in the
determination of whether they would be regulated by State law or Federal law, but also, as
provided in the bill, any movement toward increased State jurisdiction would be done in an
orderly and gradual fashion. Many States are well prepared to handle some aspects of this
responsibility, but unwilling or unable to handle all responsibilities properly. Under the
provisions of Public Law 280, our experience over the last 15 years has shown instances
where States failed to give adequate protection or services to members of tribes because the
States were unwilling to commit the resources necessary to properly enforce their laws.
One of the attractive features of the bill is that those States which previously acquired
jurisdiction under Public Law 280, but which are not now able to properly handle that
responsibility, may now retrocede that jurisdiction back to the Federal Government.
Moreover, in States where some tribes are more suited for State regulation than others, this
bill would permit the State to assume jurisdiction over some Indian territory without hav-
ing to assume jurisdiction over all Indian territory. Similarly, if a State is particularly well
equipped in a particular field, such a mental health or facilities for juvenile delinquency, the
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country is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States unless the offense is by one Indian against another.
There being no tribal criminal justice system of the KCA
[Kiowa, Comanche, Apache] tribes, it follows that jurisdic-
tion over offenses by one Indian against another Indian,
other than the thirteen specified major crimes, is vested in the
courts of the State of Oklahoma.'
The notion that the federal agency should assist the tribal
government in developing the tribal criminal justice system was
not considered and the assumption was made that some other ele-
ment of government had lawfully assumed the tribal prerogatives.
An illustration of the situation in a civil context is readily found
in the creation of the Indian housing authorities within the state of
Oklahoma. While Section 1151 of Title 18 of the United States
Code specifically defines Indian country for criminal jurisdiction
purposes, it has repeatedly been inferentially or directly applied
by the courts in Indian civil jurisdiction cases."6 In addition, post-
1948 legislation reveals that Congress subscribes to this statutory
definition of Indian country for civil jurisdictional purposes."
Therefore, the generally accepted operating area of an Indian tribe
for civil purposes is the Section 1151 Indian country subject to its
jurisdiction.'
With Indian tribes across the nation, Indian housing authorities
are created pursuant to the tribes' inherent power by tribal resolu-
tion or ordinance." These authorities are, in effect, tribal bodies
politic and corporate and owe their powers to a delegation of
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specific authority from the tribe.' Where an Indian tribe has been
terminated from federal supervision and the tribal powers re-
duced, or where no governmental relationship with the federal
government has existed, or where the tribe's powers are unde-
fined, the federal agencies generally take the position that the tribe
does not have sufficient governmental authority to create and
operate a housing authority."' When the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) began to receive funds to provide
housing for the economically disadvantaged, it was accepted, con-
sistent with the confusion and resulting mythology concerning the
legal status of the Indian tribes in Oklahoma, that the "Oklahoma
Indians" did not possess the inherent power to create a housing
authority. This agency interpretation of the power of the tribes in
Oklahoma essentially meant that Indians in Oklahoma would not
be able to participate to any reasonable extent in these low-income
housing projects. To allow Indian tribes in Oklahoma to acquire
HUD housing money set aside to provide housing for Indians, in
1965 the state attempted to fill this administratively created void
by enacting authorizing legislation for the formation of Indian
housing authorities. This legislation provided:
There is hereby created, with respect to each Indian tribe,
band or nation in the state, a public body corporate and
politic, to function in the operating area of such Indian tribe,
band or nation to be known as the "housing authority" of
said Indian tribe, band or nation which shall be an agency of
the State of Oklahoma, possessing all powers, rights, and
functions herein specified for city and county authorities
created pursuant to this act ....
Confusion was added to confusion. The administrative agen-
cies, confused about the extent of the tribal powers which sur-
vived the creation of the state of Oklahoma, ignored the basic
principle of Indian law that tribal powers continue until specifical-
ly extinguished,' and ruled that somehow, according to the myth,
the tribal police power had been extinguished by inference and
that the tribes did not have sufficient power to create a housing
authority for Indians within Indian country.23 The state, in at-
tempting to fill the void created by the administrative interpreta-
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tion of the situation, ignored a principle of Indian law which has
never been successfully challenged in the Supreme Court since it
was first announced in 1832.' This principle simply holds that
state laws have no force within the territory of an Indian tribe in
matters affecting Indians without a specific delegation of power
from Congress authorizing the state to extend its laws over Indians
within the Indian country in that state. 6 The reported decisions,
Ware v. Richardson," Housing Authority of the Cherokee Nation
v. Langley,"8 and Housing Authority of the Choctaw Nation v.
Craytor,"' indicate the difficulty in trying to make logical sense of
the resulting situation. Ware, a case involving the Indian Housing
Authority of the Kiowa Tribe, was essentially a dispute between
members of the tribe and the Authority about the quality of the
homes being constructed by the Authority. The federal court held
that no federal question was involved and that the Housing
Authority was so intimately connected to the tribe, and so freed
from state control, that it was in essence an agency of the tribe.
The court went on to declare that because the case involved a
dispute between an agency of the tribe and tribal members con-
cerning the conduct of that agency, the matter was an intra-tribal
dispute and not within the jurisdiction of the court."' It would
follow, then, that such disputes would also be outside the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the state of Oklahoma. "'
fact of this type of ruling is presumed from the actual situation, which situation would
necessarily have arisen from such policy decision.
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2,l1. The question of jurisdiction of the courts of the state of Oklahoma over tribal mat-
ters was presented in the recent cage, United States v. Pawnee Business Council, 382 F.
Supp. 54 (N.D. Okla. 1974). The Federal Court in the Northern District of Oklahoma held
that a judicial determination of the District Court of Pawnee County, Okla., as to the
members and president of the tribe's Business Council was void.
The court, relying on the intra-tribal dispute doctrine, determined that the acknowledg-
ment by the Secretary of the Interior of one of two contending factions of the Pawnee Tribe
as to the proper membership of the Council was correct and that a determination of the
membership by a district court of the state of Oklahoma was improper and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
The court explained its decision by saying: "The Court recognizes the legion cases from
this Circuit and elsewhere that the Federal Courts are without jurisdiction to entertain and
decide internal Indian affairs, matters or disputes; that Congress had exclusive plenary
legislative authority over such affairs and has designated and empowered the Secretary of
the Interior in this regard. The Court must further recognize that this prohibition of judicial
action must also apply to State Courts as well as Federal Courts. This being so, the Court
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, however, has twice held that
the Indian housing authorities are agencies of the state, not agen-
cies of the tribe. Thus, the court has upheld the exercise of eminent
domain by the Housing Authority of the Cherokee Nation,2" and
in a dispute between tribal members and the tribal government,
has ordered a district court of Oklahoma to accept jurisdiction to
determine the proper membership of the Housing Authority of the
Choctaw Nation.'
The precise legal nature of these authorities remains unresolved.
If these authorities are agencies of the tribes, from what source did
they derive their power to act? The Kiowa Tribe has no approved
ordinance or resolution which establishes a housing authority and
grants to that authority specific powers from which to operate
within the Indian country subject to the jurisdiction of the Kiowa
Tribe. " If these authorities are agencies of the state, where did the
state obtain power to extend its laws into the Indian country in
such a manner as to affect any interest of the Indian tribe or its
members residing therein, or to subject them to its civil or criminal
process?25
Littlechie, 246 a criminal case directly concerning the Kiowa In-
dian Housing Authority, focuses the unusual situation which
results from the exclusion of tribal governments from their lawful
prerogatives as a matter of policy. Littlechief, a Kiowa Indian
allegedly killed his father, another Kiowa Indian, on a Kiowa In-
finds and declares that, as the membership of the Business Council and who is its President
are internal tribal affairs, [the judicial determinations in these respects and any injunctive
order in support thereof by the District Court of Pawnee County, Oklahoma, as aforesaid
are void for lack of jurisdiction]". Id. at 58.
The intra-tribal dispute doctrine has been recently upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court held that the sovereign immunity of the tribe from suit precluded a civil
action against the tribe even for rights granted as against the tribe by the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-303 (1970). Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). If
Indian tribes are immune from suit in the federal courts, the certainly must be immune from
state court proceedings.
The resolution of the intra-tribal dispute problem is relatively simple. The Indian tribes
must establish tribal forums to hear and decide internal matters of this sort which are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal dispute resolution processes.
242. Housing Auth. of Cherokee Nation v. Langley, 555 P.2d 1025 (Okla. 1976).
243. Housing Auth. of Choctaw Nation v. Craytor, 50 OKLA. B.A.J. 1411, No. 53411
(June 26,1979).
244. Kennerly v. District Ct., 400 U.S. 424 (1971) disposes of the proposition that the
authority can legally act under a state grant of power with the approval of the tribal govern-
ing body in the negative. Before state power can take effect, the requirements of 25 U.S.C.
§ 1326 (1970) must be met. See Housing Author. of Choctaw Nation v. Craytor, 50 OKLA.
B.A.J. 1411 (June 26, 1979).
245. COHEN, supra note 1, at 116-17. See also Kennerly v. District Ct., 400 U.S. 424
(1971).
246. State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. Cr. 1978).
dian allotment, in a HUD-financed house, built and serviced by
the Housing Authority of the Kiowa Tribe.2"' Both the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals and the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma ruled that, as a matter of law, the
state of Oklahoma had no jurisdiction to try Littlechief for murder
because the allotment was Indian country and jurisdiction was
vested in the federal courts."8 However, if Littlechief had been a
tenant occupying that same house, the Oklahoma law establishing
the Housing Authority purports to grant the Authority the power
to subpoena Littlechief to testify before the Authority through ser-
vice of state civil process and to evict him for breach of his agree-
ment with the Authority." ' In the absence of a specific grant of
power from Congress allowing the state of Oklahoma to exert its
jurisdiction over Indians within the Indian country, the assertion
of state civil jurisdiction is clearly contrary to the established body
of federal Indian law.'
It must be emphasized that this result is not an outgrowth of the
law applying to Indians within Oklahoma, but is an outgrowth of
the policy of the administrative agencies and the state of
Oklahoma which ignores the legitimate tribal prerogatives which
are sustainable in law.
The administrative agencies and the state have often interpreted
the extent of the current tribal powers in a manner which is
counter to the generally accepted body of Indian law and the
specific statutory law effective in Oklahoma. These interpreta-
tions have been repeated so often that they have, in effect, become
slogans which have been enforced as a matter of policy. The
2,47. Id.
2,48. Id. (The state court opinion contains the full text of the federal decision; 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1151, 1153 (1970).
2.49. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1061(a)(b)(h) (1971).
250. State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. Cr. 1978); COHEN, supra note 1, at 116-17.
See also DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975); McClanahan v. Arizona
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 177-78 n.17 (1973); Kennerly v. District Ct., 400 U.S. 424, 425
n.1 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-22 nn.5, 6, 10 (1959); Annis v. Dewey Coun-
ty Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133, 134 (D.S.D. 1971); Crow Indian Tribe v. Deemose, 158 Mont.
25, 487 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1971); Sigane v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 164 N.W.2d 886, 888-89
(1969); Boyer v. Shoshone-Bannock Indian Tribes, 92 Idaho 257, 441 P.2d 167, 170-71
(1978); Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 482, 161 N.W.2d 704, 705 (1968); Smith v. Temple, 82
S.D. 650, 152 N.W.2d 547, 548 (1967); State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Ct., 57 Wash. 2d
181, 356 P.2d 985, 990 (1960). Compare, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970) (criminal)
with 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970) (civil), both from the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-
280, 67 Stat. 588, 589, and25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1970) (criminal) with 25 U.S.C. § 1322, 1326
(1970) (civil), both from the Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 201, 82 Stat. 77,
for examples of the undifferentiated use of the term "Indian country." See also H.R. REP.
No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 6, (1953), and Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608
(196,), 92 Stat. 3069 (Indian Child Welfare Act).
critical analysis of the events surrounding the creation of the state
of Oklahoma in the first portion of this article clearly indicates
that, for the tribes embraced in what was the Oklahoma Ter-
ritory, the inherent tribal powers survived the creation of the state
almost totally intact, although the physical area within which
those powers could be exerted was greatly reduced. For those
tribes in what remained of the Indian Territory from 1890 until the
time of statehood, the question is more complex, although there
are indications that the inherent powers of those tribes may have
survived the destruction of the vehicles for their expression." In
other words, the Indian tribes of the Oklahoma Territory emerged
from the period during which the state of Oklahoma was created
with essentially the same governing authority they possessed prior
to 1890. Only the area of exercise of those powers had been re-
duced. The tribes maintained their governmental authority over
the areas retained by them to the exclusion of the state, to the
same extent that the classical "reservation tribes" retain govern-
mental authority over their reservations. ' 2 The Kiowa Tribe,
therefore, retains the power to create and supervise an Indian
Housing Authority within its jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
state. When such a housing authority is created pursuant to tribal
law, the problems inherent in the status of the current state-
created Indian housing authorities are nonexistent.
It is very clear that this solution is simply a matter of policy, not
of law. The laws regarding Indian tribes in Oklahoma clearly sup-
port the exercise by Indian tribes of their inherent powers.
However, recognition and exercise of tribal governmental powers
does not come by academic research. Academic knowledge of the
tribal legal status is only ancillary to the exercise of tribal powers.
The process of progressing beyond worn-out slogans and the pre-
sent caretaker status of tribal governments merely requires a
change of policy and attitude, not law. The breadth of the law is
sufficient to allow for the orderly development of tribal govern-
ment. In this situation, sovereignty is merely a state of mind, and
attitude is often worth more than facts.
Returning once again to the development of the inherent tribal
law and order functions as an illustration, the cited weaknesses of
the tribal governments in Oklahoma can become a source of
strength for the cooperative development of a better law enforce-
ment system for all Oklahomans. It has been said that the
"checkerboard" pattern of Indian country, which is predominant
251. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
252. COHEN, supra note 1, at 116-17.
in western Oklahoma, is a liability for the exercise of police
powers by the tribal governments. However, this circumstance
can be a strength, in that Indian tribes will generally develop their
tribal justice systems in the context of these largely rural checker-
board areas where local Oklahoma law enforcement agencies are
often understaffed and underequipped. Particularly in the less
populated rural Oklahoma counties, cross-deputizing of state and
tribal law enforcement officers will result in lower response times,
more materiel, and additional trained manpower actually patrol-
ling in the field. 21, With all law enforcement officers in a coun-
ty-tribal, state, county, and city-empowered to respond to any
complaint anywhere in the county through the use of cross-
deputization, every citizen of Oklahoma will benefit from the
recognition of the tribe as a working partner in the exercise of
governmental authority within the state. When the New
Federalism and Indian self-determination strategies for better
government, recognition of inherent tribal powers, and simple in-
tergovernmental cooperation can achieve results of this kind, that
which is good for Indians is good for Oklahoma.
253. The state has recently recognized the effectiveness of the cross-deputizing arrange-
ment whereby one law enforcement officer, hired and paid by any one jurisdiction but car-
rying state, tribal, and federal commissions, may enforce the laws of any level of govern-
ment over any person wherever located. In this situation, immediate response to critical
situations is greatly enhanced and the only "problem" to be resolved is which jurisdiction
will try the accused. The authority to commission tribal law enforcement officers as
"special OSBI law enforcement officers" is found in Executive Order 79-6, filed in the
Oklahoma Secretary of State's office, Mar. 26, 1979, and authority for Oklahoma law en-
forcement officers to accept tribal and BIA (federal) commissions is found in Att'y Gen.
Op. No. 78-176 (Okla. Jan. 4,1978).
